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6.1  Introduction 
In all countries, the public sector  owns substantial  amounts of capital. 
Governments also invest as well as consume and make transfer pay- 
ments. Government capital, like private capital, also depreciates. Most 
advanced countries attempt to incorporate this information, however 
imperfectly, in their formal budget documents by generating separate 
capital and current accounts. The U.S. federal government is the most 
conspicuous exception. 
Government capital formation raises a number of issues important 
to national  economic well-being.  For example, net capital formation 
may be a major component of net national saving or dissaving. It may 
be more appropriate to finance government capital formation than gov- 
ernment consumption by borrowing rather than taxing. Some types of 
government  capital formation are complementary to private  activity 
and enhance productivity, but government investments do not have to 
meet the same kind of  market test as private investment does.' We do 
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not have an analogue to the stock market to value it. Thus, measures 
of government capital and investment may provide particularly useful 
information that cannot be inferred from other data. 
Measuring government capital raises difficult conceptual issues (see, 
e.g., Eisner and Nebhut 1982). Among these are the questions of what 
government versus private product is and what capital is.* Another set 
of questions concerns whether to include and how to measure govern- 
ment human capital in~estment.~ 
Still, separating out capital and current expenditures and generating 
sensible measures of depreciation and net investment can be important 
inputs into various kinds of economic analyses. It would enable us to 
provide a more accurate picture of how government is using the funds 
that it raises. It could help develop better measures of productivity and 
capital. It can improve our understanding of fiscal history and highlight 
emerging fiscal issues, such as the alleged deterioration of  the infra- 
structure. It may be useful in explaining private consumption and saving 
(Boskin 1988). Most important from the standpoint of this paper, it is 
a necessary input into comprehensive measures of net national saving 
and national wealth and into government balance sheets. 
One purpose of  this paper is to provide estimates of various types 
of  government investment,  depreciation, and capital. Our major in- 
novations  lie  in  the estimates of  depreciation of  fixed reproducible 
capital, the value of government land, and the value of  government 
mineral rights. 
We  then use these series, and corresponding ones for the private 
sector, to obtain values for government consumption  and net worth 
and to adjust gross national product (GNP), net national product (NNP), 
and national saving and investment figures from the national income 
and product accounts (NIPAs). Thus, we seek to complement previous 
studies attempting to extend measures of national income and product 
to a more comprehensive treatment of  the government sector (e.g., 
Eisner and Nebhut  1982; Goldsmith  1962, 1982; Martin, Landefeld, 
and Peskin 1982; Kendrick  1976; Eisner and Pieper  1984; and Eisner 
1986). 
We  focus on a particular subset of  improvements to the NIPAs and 
previous studies while ignoring others. For example, we do not examine 
mandated private activity or uncompensated or undercompensated ser- 
vices; nor  do we  examine human  capital expenditures.  This is not 
because we consider these issues unimportant but because such a focus 
allows us to concentrate on other issues. Even with this deliberately 
narrow focus, our estimates of GNP and NNP extended to include the 
return to government capital substantially exceed the traditional num- 
bers. Our estimates of the combined state-local and federal government 
capital stock are a large fraction of the analogously computed private 
capital stock. Government net saving, defined as revenues less con- 289  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
sumption rather than by the traditional budget surplus or deficit figures 
(in accord with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment  [OECD] and U.N.  system of  national accounts for other 
countries), and government net capital formation are substantial. They 
also vary over time and can be important components of  net national 
saving and net national investment. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses fixed 
reproducible capital-the  methodology, concerns with the traditional 
estimates of  the Bureau  of  Economic Analysis  (BEA), and various 
estimates and trends of fixed reproducible capital of the federal and 
state-local governments in the United  States. It provides  important 
estimates based on depreciation assumptions that are consistent with 
empirical estimates for the private sector. The depreciation estimates 
generate internally consistent capital stock and imputed rent series. It 
also presents consistent real net revaluation estimates. 
Section 6.3 discusses government inventories, presents data on in- 
ventory values, including military and nonmilitary as well as a break- 
down by level of government, and compares inventory investment with 
fixed reproducible investment. It also discusses real revaluations for 
inventories. 
In Section 6.4, we provide comparisons of  these estimates of gov- 
ernment investment and capital stocks to estimates of net investment 
and capital stocks in the private sector. We  update through  1985 and 
expand the estimates of Hulten and Wykoff (1981) to consumer durables 
and residential capital. We also compare government and private capital 
stocks using consistent depreciation assumptions, although they may 
be controversial ones. 
Section 6.5 presents revised  saving, investment, and consumption 
as well as adjusted GNP and NNP estimates. In addition to imputing 
the rental flow from government capital as current consumption and 
developing improved estimates of depreciation to estimate net invest- 
ment and the accrued capital stock, we also make corresponding ad- 
justments for consumer durables purchases. These are substantial in 
the United States, substantially exceed the depreciation of the durables, 
and hence contribute an important component to national capital for- 
mation (for an elaboration of the important role such adjustments can 
play in international comparisons-e.g., with Japan-see  Boskin and 
Roberts 1986). The data reveal interesting patterns of government con- 
sumption, saving, and net  investment.  The federal and, even more 
important, state and local government sectors are major contributors 
to national capital formation, and their patterns of capital formation 
have differed substantially over time and relative to the private sector. 
Financial assets and conventional liabilities are discussed in section 
6.6. It presents the real market values of federal and state-local financial 
assets and liabilities. It updates and makes minor changes to the work 290  M. J. BoskinIM. S. RobinsonlA. M. Huber 
of Eisner and Pieper (1984) and Eisner (1986), which draw on the work 
of  Seater (1981) and Cox and Hirschhorn (1983). In addition to the 
tangible assets, government units also have substantial financial assets 
as well as the traditional liabilities, which have drawn so much recent 
attention. 
Section 6.7 updates and corrects estimates of the value of federal 
mineral rights developed by Boskin et al. (1985) and extends the anal- 
ysis-albeit  on the basis  of  scanty data-to  state and local mineral 
rights. The value of  these rights is quite large and fluctuates substan- 
tially, as one might suppose, given the substantial fluctuation in the 
prices of minerals. In some years, the change in the value of mineral 
rights exceeds the conventionally measured budget deficit. 
Section 6.8 discusses the value of federal and state-local ownership 
of land. Again, this extends the analysis in Boskin et al. (1985) to the 
last several years and to the state and local sector. Various method- 
ological issues are discussed. Governments own a substantial fraction 
of the total acreage of land in the United States and a modest fraction 
of the total value of land. 
Section 6.9  is concerned with contingent liabilities such as loan guar- 
antees, deposit insurance, and government pension liabilities. We  do 
not provide  systematic time series on the value of  these contingent 
liabilities but discuss the conceptual issues in valuing them and some 
data on the outstanding value of  loans, guarantees, and insured de- 
posits. The economic consequences of subsidized loans or loan guar- 
antees depend heavily on one’s view of credit markets, especially the 
supply of funds to them (see Gale 1987). Various issues are discussed 
in defining a sensible estimate of  the expected present  value of the 
contingent Liabilities flowing from new commitments of  subsidized loans 
and guarantees and deposit insurance. 
Section 6.10 discusses the most important set of  potential govern- 
ment liabilities, the unfunded liabilities in social security and govern- 
ment pension plans. We  refer the reader to other sources for time series 
on these data, but  we discuss a variety of issues surrounding these 
unfunded liabilities and their sensitivity to various economic and de- 
mographic assumptions as well as to political decisions, and we high- 
light some key recent events in the system. 
In section 6.1  1, we present a preliminary attempt to develop a balance 
sheet for the government sector of the U.S. economy. After discussing 
the advantages and numerous limitations of our estimates and govern- 
ment net worth calculations in general, we present balance sheets for 
federal and state-local governments for selected years. The trends, par- 
ticularly in federal “net worth,” are sometimes dramatic. Lookingat tan- 
gible  and  financial  assets  and  conventional  liabilities,  the  federal 
government had a net worth (in 1985 dollars) of over $1.0 trillion in 1980, 
substantially higher than in 1970, but had lost two-thirds of it by 1985. 291  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
A brief conclusion summarizes the results and emphasizes the large 
number of caveats we have had to invoke along the way. It also suggests 
various avenues for future research. 
6.2  Fixed Reproducible Capital 
Goldsmith (1962) and Kendrick (1976) both estimated the government 
capital stock as part of their pioneering studies’of  national wealth. The 
most recent and comprehensive estimates of fixed reproducible gov- 
ernment capital stocks have been made by the BEA.4  All three studies 
use the perpetual inventory method  to calculate net  capital  stocks: 
gross investment is cumulated, and estimated accumulated depreciation 
is subtracted. Our estimates use the BEAs gross investment series and 
most of their service life assumptions, but we adopt a different depre- 
ciation method. 
The BEA assumes straight-line depreciation over the estimated eco- 
nomic service life of each asset.s However, within each category of 
structure or equipment, the BEA allows for a distribution in service 
lives around the mean, reflecting a retirement distribution.6 Since the 
assets with the shortest assumed lives are retired first, the depreciation 
rate for any category of investment slows down once retirements start 
to occur. The resulting overall depreciation pattern resembles a geo- 
metric decay. 
The straight-line assumption made by the BEA is basically arbitrary. 
A more satisfactory approach to estimating economic depreciation makes 
use of the observed sales prices of used assets. For the private sector, 
Hulten  and  Wykoff  (1981) collected  data on  used  asset  price  from 
several sources, weighted these price by estimated survival probabil- 
ities to account for discarded assets, and estimated the form and rate 
of economic depreciation. They used a functional form that included 
all the common assumptions-geometric,  linear, or one-hoss-shay-as 
special cases. Although none of the common forms was accepted sta- 
tistically, the estimated price-age profiles were found to be close to 
geometric for the classes of assets considered.’  They then estimated 
the constant depreciation rate that provided the best fit. 
These results were used to derive depreciation rates for the types of 
producers’ durables and nonresidential structures defined in the NIPAs. 
There were sufficient  data to  estimate some types directly. The declining- 
balance rates, R,  found for these categories were used to infer deprecia- 
tion rates, 6, for the remainder from the definition 6 = R/T,  where Tequals 
the BEA estimated service life. The average R value for four equipment 
categories was 1.65, so depreciation rates for other equipment classes 
were calculated as 6 = 1.65 / T. The average R value for two types of 
structures was 0.91, so depreciation rates assigned to other types of 
structures were 6 = 0.91 / T. 292  M. J. BoskinIM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
The Hulten-Wykoff depreciation rates are consistent with the ob- 
servations of Young and Musgrave (1980) and Hulten and Wykoff (1981) 
summarizing earlier studies: equipment depreciates faster than straight 
line in the early years, while structures depreciate more slowly. These 
depreciation rates are certainly significant topics for future research, 
but we feel that the Hulten-Wykoff depreciation estimates are the best 
available.8 
In addition to fitting the used-asset-price data more closely, the geo- 
metric depreciation assumption has important theoretical  advantage^.^ 
The depreciation methods and measures used in the NIPAs, the BEA 
capital stock series, the important work of Denison (1957, 1962, 1967, 
1972, 1974, 1979, 1985>,  Kendrick (1973), and studies using the NIPA 
and/or BEA capital stock data are internally inconsistent. The measures 
of capital must employ the same pattern of relative differences of capital 
goods of  different vintages for both capital stocks and rental prices. 
As pointed out originally by Jorgenson and Griliches (1972), the de- 
preciation patterns assumed in these studies cannot be used both to 
impute the rental prices and to measure the capital stocks against which 
the rental prices are applied to measure imputed rent, gross or net.I0 
The principle disadvantage of geometric depreciation is that retirement 
never occurs. Of course, all simple depreciation formulae assume that 
depreciation is constant over time and across assets within a category. 
Given the empirical evidence and theoretical advantages, we assume 
that fixed government capital depreciates geometrically. Lacking evi- 
dence on prices for used government assets,ll we use the market evi- 
dence on used private assets gathered by Hulten and Wykoff; that is, 
the depreciation rate for government equipment is  1.654service life) 
and that for each type of  structure is 0.9l/(service life). With one ex- 
ception, the BEA-estimated service lives for the various types of gov- 
ernment capital are used to infer depreciation rates.I2 
Our estimates of  the net investment and net  stock of  government 
fixed reproducible capital in  1985 dollars are shown in  table 6.1. We 
give our separate estimates for federal and state-local governments in 
table 6.2. Both tables give the corresponding estimates for the BEA, 
updated by us to 1985 d01lars.I~ 
We  estimate that the net government fixed reproducible capital stock 
exceeds $2.7 trillion dollars, having more than doubled in real terms 
since World War 11. As can be seen in figure 6.1, the broad trends of 
our estimates are consistent with those of the BEA, which is not sur- 
prising since we  use  their gross investment data and  most  of  their 
service lives. Nevertheless, there are important differences between 
the two series regarding both the level and the postwar growth of the 
government capital stock. Our 1985 estimate is 19 percent higher than 
that of  the BEA, while at the end of  World  War I1  our value was 8 293  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Table 6.1  Total Government Fixed Reproducible Capital (billions of 
1985 dollars) 
Net Stock  Net Investment 
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-  129.7 
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Table 6.1  (continued) 
Net Stock  Net Investment 












































































Sources: Fixed reproducible capital includes equipment and nonresidential and residential 
structures. The BEA  series are constant-cost estimates in 1982 dollars updated to 1985 
dollars by our use of price series implicit in the BEA  current- and constant-cost estimates 
of net capital stocks and depreciation flows for each asset category. The same procedure 
was used to convert our estimates (the series labeled “BRH”)  from 1982 dollars into 
1985 dollars. Our estimates employ the perpetual inventory method and use BEA  gross 
investment data. Given the evidence of Hulten and Wykoff (1981) on the depreciation 
of  private assets, we assume geometric depreciation of  government capital with a de- 
clining-balance rate for equipment of 1.65/(service  life) and for structures of 0.9l/(service 
life). We  use BEA  estimated service lives, including detailed lives available for some 
types of  capital based on observed usage, to infer depreciation rates, except that we 
assume a shorter forty-year service life for highways and streets. The 1986 BEA  wealth 
data tape, unpublished BEA  data kindly provide by John Musgrave, and several Survey 
of  Current Business articles are our principal data sources. For further details on our 
methods, see text. 
percent  10wer.l~  The BEAs estimate of  the postwar growth  in  net 
government capital is more than 40 percent below ours. 
With  the  exception of World  War  11,  state and local  government 
capital stocks have been larger than those of the federal government, 
as shown in figure 6.2. Currently, state and local governments own 69 
percent of total government fixed reproducible capital. Except during 
military buildups, state and local governments provide an even larger 
fraction of total government investment, as can be seen in figure 6.3. 
The surges in federal investment roughly coincide with World War 11, 
the Korean and Vietnam wars, and the Reagan defense buildup. 
The behavior of  the various components of federal and state-local 
investment and capital sheds light on several policy debates, though 
we can only touch on them in this paper. Figure 6.4  pictures the division 295  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Table 6.2  Federal and State-Local Fixed Reproducible Capital (billions of 
1985 dollars) 
Federal  State-Local 
Net Stock  Net Investment  Net Stock  Net Investment 

















































































































































-  1.9 
-  1.7 
-  1.1 
















-  181.9 
-  137.4 
-95.4 
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-  .9 
-3.6 
-  1.3 
-  1.0 

















-  118.5 
-  82.9 
-  55.7 
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(continued) Table 6.2  (continued) 
Federal  State-Local 
Net Stock  Net Investment  Net Stock  Net Investment 
Year  BEA  BRH  BEA  BRH  BEA  BRH  BEA  BRH 
1975  544.8  673.8  .7  5.6 
1976  547.3  681.0  2.5  7.1 
1977  551.0  689.1  3.6  8.1 
1978  563.2  705.1  12.0  15.8 
1979  574.8  719.8  11.3  14.4 
1980  586.3  734.2  11.3  14.2 
1981  598.3  748.5  11.7  14.1 
1982  621.6  772.9  22.8  23.9 
1983  641.9  793.9  19.9  20.6 
1984  665.9  817.8  23.5  23.5 
1985  698.7  849.4  31.3  31.1 
Sources: See source note to  table 6.1 and text. 
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Billions 
Of  1985  Ss 
Year 
Fig. 6.4  Our (BRH) estimates of  federal net investment  in fixed re- 
producible capital 
of aggregate federal net investment between military and nonmilitary. 
For a twenty-five year period beginning in 1954, the military and non- 
military series track fairly closely, with nonmilitary investment usually 
slightly larger.  Starting in  1979, however, the two series diverge, as 
military net investment has reached record postwar levels and civilian 
investment has dropped. 
In figure 6.5,  we divide net state and local investment into three 
major  categories:  educational  buildings,  highways,  and  other.  The 
“other” category is primarily other types of structures; equipment is 
less than  5  percent of the net state and local stock, The three com- 
ponents have a similar pattern: after disinvestment during World War 
11,  all three reach peaks in the late 1960s and drop to troughs in the 
recent recession. The observed pattern of  aggregate net investment, 
therefore, cannot be attributed solely to the baby boom or the con- 
struction of the interstate highway  system. The substantial levels of 
net investment in the highway and other categories, even in recessions, 
casts doubt on reports of a deteriorating infrastructure. 
6.2.1  Real Revaluations of Tangible Fixed Reproducible Capital 
The data discussed above and presented in tables 6.  I  and 6.2 do not 
include net revaluations for tangible reproducible capital due to changes 299  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the  U.S 
Billions 
of 1985 $s 
Highways 
30 T 
1927  1932  1937  1942  1947  1952  1957  1962  1967  1972  1977  1982 
Year 
Fig. 6.5  Our (BRH) estimates of  state and local net investment  in 
fixed reproducible capital 
in capital goods prices relative to the general price level. They deflate 
current-dollar figures by the BEA implicit deflators for each type of 
capital. Because real revaluations can be substantial (see Eisner 1980), 
we present data on real revaluations (in constant 1985 dollars) of federal 
and state-local tangible fixed reproducible capital in table 6.3. Real net 
revaluations  are defined as the change in  the value of capital minus 
real net investment and minus the change in  the value of capital that 
would just compensate for changes in the general price level. Thus, 
real net investment (calculated from the specific implicit price deflators 
for investment goods) plus real net revaluations plus the real capital 
stock in period t - 1 equals the real capital stock in period t (where 
the real capital stocks are just the current-cost series as deflated by 
the respective end-of-year GNP deflator).  l6 
As table 6.3 reveals, both the federal and the state-local sectors have 
experienced  substantial real capital gains and losses on their corre- 
sponding fixed capital stocks. The net revaluations were generally neg- 
ative in the 1950s and 1960s, positive in the 1970s, and negative in the 
1980s. While real revaluations are substantial in absolute dollars and 
relative to net investment, they are modest relative to the capital stock. 
For example, the $170 billion and $32 billion real revaluations of state- 
local and federal capital stocks for  1974 amount to about  10  and 5 300  M. J. BoskinlM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
Table 6.3  Real Net Revaluations of Government Fixed Reproducible Capital 
(billions of 1985 dollars) 
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41.2 
percent of the corresponding stocks but  were much larger than net 
investment. These large real capital gains were  offset the following 
year by real losses approximately half as large. Indeed, cumulating the 
combined state-local and federal net revaluations from  1948 to 1985 
yields a total of about $160 billion, or 6 percent of the estimated 1985 
real  net  stock, excluding revaluations. Thus, while the year-to-year 301  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
fluctuations are important, the overall cumulative real wealth effect of 
revaluations has been quite modest, as is evident from figure 6.1. In 
principle, one would add real net revaluations to real net investment 
to obtain total net capital formation for each year. Since we often wish 
to compare gross or net investment spending with borrowing, we adopt 
the procedure here of separate presentations of  real revaluations but 
do include the values adjusted for revaluations in the balance sheets 
in section 6.11. 
6.3  Government Inventories 
The focus of the previous section was on government equipment and 
structures, but inventories are an important part of government repro- 
ducible capital, at least at the federal level. Table 6.4 presents estimates 
of inventory stocks and investment for both the federal government 
and the government sector. These are unpublished BEA series updated 
by us to 1985 dollars.” 
Table 6.4  Federal and Total Government  Inventory Stocks and Investment 
(billions of  1985 dollars) 
Federal  Federal  Total  Total  Total Real 
Year  Stock  Investment  Stock  Investment  Revaluations 
1926  3.0 
1927  3.  I 
1928  3.1 
1929  3.2 
I930  3.3 
I93  I  3.4 
1932  3.5 
1933  3.6 
1934  4.7 
1935  4.8 
I936  4.2 
1937  4.7 
1938  7.0 
1939  9.4 
I940  13.7 
1941  28.5 
I942  62.2 
1943  113.9 
I944  173.8 
1945  208.4 
I946  173.5 
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Table 6.4  (continued) 
Federal  Federal  Total  Total  Total Real 
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88.2  7.6 
112.4  24.2 
145.8  33.3 
162.2  16.5 
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159.1  -  .9 
160.2  1.1 
155.5  -  4.7 
150.8  -  4.7 
144.5  -6.3 
146.5  2.0 
150.7  4.2 
147.2  -3.5 
139.0  -8.2 
135.3  -3.6 
141.9  6.5 
144.6  2.8 
158.8  14.2 
152.5  -6.3 
147.2  -  5.4 
135.8  -11.4 
127.6  -8.2 
132.1  4.5 
128.8  -  3.3 
127.9  -  .9 
131.5  3.6 
137.1  5.6 
132.7  -  4.5 
132.3  -  .4 
138.0  5.7 
156.6  18.6 
169.2  12.6 
182.5  13.3 
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1.2 
-  4.5 
-  4.7 
-  6.3 
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4.3 
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-8.1 






-  11.3 
-8.1 
4.6 
-  3.0 



















-  11.8 
-  4.9 
-4.6 
-  4.9 
-4.0 
-  6.8 
-  3.0 
-  1.2 
-  3.3 
-  8.0 
-4.2 
-  4.9 
-  5.5 
-  5.4 










-  2.6 
-  1.5 
-  16.9 
-9.1 
-8.1 
Source: Unpublished BEA  1982 constant dollar estimates of end-of-year stocks of federal 
government military, federal government nonmilitary, and state and local government 
inventories were each updated to  1985 constant dollars by multiplying by the ratio of 
the 1985 BEA  current dollar stock to the 1985 constant (1982) dollar stock for each type. 
Revaluations are calculated as described in text. 303  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Government inventories  are substantial, exceeding $200 billion  in 
1985, finally surpassing the World War I1 peak. Almost all the inven- 
tories are held by the federal government; for most years, state and 
local  governments had  less than  1  percent of  the total. Figure  6.6 
illustrates that most of these federal inventories are military, such as 
munitions. Not surprisingly, military inventories are quite volatile. 
Nonmilitary inventories have grown, however, from 5 percent of the 
stock in  1945  to almost 40 percent in  1985. A further breakdown of 
nonmilitary inventories reveals that, in 1982, more than half were stra- 
tegic  stockpiles  of  minerals,  nuclear  materials,  helium, and oil  (the 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve).lB  More than two-thirds of the remaining 
nonmilitary inventories were surplus crops. 
Real inventory stocks declined steadily from 1954 through 1980. Since 
then, inventory investment has taken off, reaching $33 billion in 1985. 
Inventory changes have a large effect on the level of net federal in- 
vestment  in reproducible capital, as shown in figure 6.7. Net federal 
investment in structures and equipment has been positive every year 
since 1950, according to our estimates. When inventories are added in, 
however, net federal investment becomes negative in five of the last 
thirty-five years. When inventories increase, as they did in the 1980s, 
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Fig. 6.7  Federal government net investment in reproducible capital: 
Total and excluding inventories (fixed) 
the effect is also large: more than half our estimated $64 billion in net 
federal investment in  1985 is inventory investment. 
6.3.1  Real Inventory Revaluations 
As with fixed reproducible capital, real net revaluations may occur 
for government inventories. Table 6.4 includes a column on estimated 
real  inventory  revaluations  defined analogously to that for the fixed 
reproducible  capital  stock. These data reveal  that capital  losses  on 
inventories occurred in every year except 1953-55  and 1972-80.  Cu- 
mulatively,  the total real  capital loss was approximately  $70 billion, 
about one-third of the value of the net stock excluding revaluations. 
6.4  Comparisons with Private Capital 
One of the purposes of this paper is to present more comprehensive 
measures of national product and investment. While we concentrate 
on government capital, consistency requires  adjustments to private 
capital measures as well. These adjustments also allow a more accurate 
comparison between private capital and investment and our estimates 
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Our measures differ from the NIPAs in the treatment of  consumer 
durables and in our depreciation assumptions. As many have noted,I9 
expenditures on consumer durables should be treated as investment, 
while an imputed service flow from these assets should be added to 
consumption. Accordingly, we add expenditures on consumer durables 
to gross private domestic investment. 
In order to determine private capital stock and net investment, de- 
preciation assumptions must be made. For the various classes of struc- 
tures and equipment, we generally use the constant depreciation rates 
that were estimated and imputed by Hulten and Wykoff (1981).*O For 
those categories whose service lives, as estimated by the BEA, changed, 
we imputed depreciation rates using the formulas described in section 
6.2. For residential structures, we assumed a depreciation rate of 0.91/ 
(service life) for the various components, as with most other categories 
of structures. For consumer durables other than vehicles, we followed 
Christensen and Jorgenson (1  973) in assuming double-declining balance 
depreciation, and we used the BEAs estimated service lives for the 
various components.21  For vehicles, we took the depreciation rates for 
the corresponding  business categories estimated by Hulten and Wykoff. 
Our estimates of the various components of the private capital stock 
are presented for selected years in  1985 dollars in table 6.5. Our value 
for the total private capital stock in  1985 is $11.0 trillion, which is 16 
percent above that of the BEA.22 
Regardless of whether one takes our estimates or those of the BEA, 
the government  sector clearly owns a large fraction of  our national 
capital stock. As shown in figure 6.8 and table 6.5, total government 
tangible capital is 27  percent of  the size of  the private  capital stock 
and 55 percent as large as the stock of private nonresidential structures, 
equipment, and inventories. A comparison of government and private 
net investment is made in figure 6.9. Government investment is much 
less cyclical than private investment and actually exceeded total private 
nonresidential investment in 1982. 
6.5  New Estimates of  Adjusted GNP, NNP, Government 
Consumption, Saving, and Investment 
The discussion above highlights the size of  the government capital 
stock and investment. Governments create a large share of the national 
capital formation, and the failure  to include the imputed  return  on 
government capital seriously distorts measures of  total consumption 
and income. The inappropriate treatment of  consumer durables also 
distorts our understanding of  investment, income, and consumption. 
These  issues are well  known  (see, e.g.,  David  and  Scadding  1974; 
Boskin 1986; Eisner and Nebhut 1982; Kendrick 1976; and Holloway, Table 6.5  New Estimates of Net Stocks of Private and Government Reproducible Capital, Excluding Revaluations (billions of  1985 dollars) 
Year 
Total 
Private  Private  Consumer  Private  = 
Nonresidential  Residential  Durables  (1)  + (2)  + (3) 











1,552.0  1,324.1  105.0  2,981.1 
1,495.2  1,336.3  88.8  2,920.3 
1,576.0  1,382.5  96.8  3,055.3 
2,146.9  2,008.2  227.1  4,382.2 
2,861.5  2,816.5  333.4  6,011.4 
4,102.1  3,754.0  581.7  8,437.8 








82.2  25.1  13.1 
108.8  34.3  17.6 
960.2  92.0  47.5 
685.8  63.6  31.1 
763.5  65.1  31.0 
802.6  59.0  28.7 
1,064.9  55.4  26.6 
Sources: Private nonresidential capital includes our estimates of fixed private nonresidential capital and inventories.  Inventory data are from Economic 
Report of’the President (1986, table  B-17);  1982 constant dollar stocks were updated  to 1985 dollars by  multiplying by the ratio  of  1985 current to 
constant (1982) dollar stock. 
Our estimates of the private  fixed nonresidential  capital stock may be considered an updating of those in Hulten and Wykoff (1981). We  use gross 
investment  data from the 1986 BEA  wealth data tape. We  assume geometric depreciation  patterns and generally use the depreciation  rates estimated 
by  Hulten and Wykoff.  For asset categories for which depreciation  rates were inferred by  Hulten and Wykoff from the average relations  d  = 0.91/ 
(service life) for structures and for which the BEA  estimated service lives have been revised, as reported in Gorman et al. (1985), we calculated revised 
depreciation rates. Where there are now multiple service lives for asset subcategories  within a type of capital, we have used the subcategory service 
life closest to the previous single service life for the asset type to infer a single depreciation  rate. We  convert our constant dollar estimates from 1982 
to 1985 dollars by using the price indices implicit in BEA  current- and constant-cost estimates for each asset type. 
Our estimates of  net private  residential capital are based on BEA  gross investment  and service life data and a geometric depreciation  rate of  0.911 
(service life), which is the average relation for nonresidential structures found by Hulten and Wykoff (1981). Gross investment data are from the 1986 
BEA  wealth data tape and the BEA  detailed industry investment tape. BEA  service lives are listed in Gorman et al. (1985). 
For consumer durables, our estimates use BEA  gross investment data from the 1986 BEA  wealth data tape and employ BEA  estimated service lives 
to infer  geometric  depreciation  rates for some assets (see Musgrave  1979). For durables other than vehicles,  we  assume double-declining balance 
depreciation.  For vehicles, we use the depreciation rates for the corresponding business categories estimated by Hulten and Wykoff. Again, our 1982 
dollar estimates  are updated to 1985 dollars by  using price indices implicit  in the  BEA  current and constant dollar data for each type of consumer 
durable. 
Government reproducible capital includes equipment, inventories, and all structures. See source notes to tables 6.1 and 6.4 307  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
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Fig. 6.9  New estimates of net investment in private and government 
reproducible capital 
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chap. 1, in this vol.). In this section, we present estimates of GNP  and 
NNP including imputed rent to durables and government capital and 
adjusted estimates of government and private consumption and saving 
and investment rates. The advantages of the work reported here, rel- 
ative to earlier studies, include the following. 
1. The estimates of government and private depreciation  are con- 
sistent with the best available empirical evidence. 
2. The depreciation  assumptions are internally consistent; that is, 
the estimates of rental prices of capital services are consistent with the 
corresponding estimates of capital stock. Unfortunately, the deprecia- 
tion estimates of the BEA capital stock series and those used in the 
NIPAs are based on an internally inconsistent  set of estimates of de- 
preciation,  stemming from  Denison  (1957). Jorgenson and  Griliches 
(1972) pointed out long ago that the Denison/NIPA approach to esti- 
mating depreciation is consistent with the basic economic concept of 
depreciation only if the relative efficiencies of capital of different ages 
decline geometrically. 
3. We  impute a constant 3 percent real rate of return net of depre- 
ciation and maintenance to government capital and consumer durables. 
Given the illiquidity of most government capital and consumer dura- 
bles, it is unlikely that the service flow from these assets fluctuates 
with any short-term variation  in the real interest  rate. A sensitivity 
analysis showed only very minor changes to variations in the assumed 
real interest rate.23 
4. We  include an imputed return for government land. 
Table 6.6 presents a reconciliation for 1985 of GNP, NNP, private 
consumption, saving, and investment, and government consumption, 
saving, and investment based on the adjustments we have made. While 
real net revaluations might be included in  net saving and investment, 
we do not do so here. First, these estimates are more readily compa- 
rable to the traditional figures. Second, we may wish to compare direct 
investment spending with various variables, not presuming revaluations 
were being forecast and used in  decision making. Further, they  are 
more important for year-to-year variation than cumulatively.  Finally, 
we often compare saving or investment to government borrowing. In 
the sections that follow, we develop more comprehensive measures of 
changes in real assets and liabilities. One might well wish to compare, 
for example, government investment with the change in real net debt 
(the changes in the real value of financial liabilities in excess of financial 
assets) or even with an estimate of real “net worth.” Again, we adopt 
the more conventional comparisons in this section, leaving the discus- 
sion of these other adjustments to subsequent sections. As can be seen, 
including the gross rent on government capital and consumer durables 
increases GNP by more than 10 percent, while including net rent and 
using our estimates of depreciation increases NNP by about 4  percent. 309  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Table 6.6  Comparison of  Adjusted and Traditional NlPAs for 1985 (billions 
of 1985 dollars) 
GNP  and NNP 
Adjusted  Traditional 
GNP 
Plus rent on government reproducible 
Plus rent on government land 
Plus rent on consumer durables 
capital" 
Equals adjusted GNP 
Less depreciation of private capitalb 
Less depreciation of government 
Less depreciation of consumer durables 
reproducible capital 
Equals NNP 
Total government purchases 
Plus rent on reproducible capital and 
Less government gross investmentC 
land 
Equals adjusted government 
Personal consumption expenditures 
Plus rent on consumer durables 
Less gross investment in consumer 




Less private consumption 
Less government consumption 
Less adjustments for net transfers and 
interest paid by government to 
foreigners and statistical discrepancy 
Equals gross saving 
Less depreciation of  traditional  private 
Less depreciation of government 
Less depreciation of consumer durables 
capital 
reproducible capital 


































4,492.7  3.998.1 
2,570.7  2,600.5 
793.7  815.4 
30.8  30.8 
1,097.6  551.5 
380.1  437.2 
97.  I 
291.0 
329.4  114.3  Equals net saving 
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Table 6.6  (continued) 
GNP and NNP 
Adjusted  Traditional 
Gross private investmentC 
Plus government gross investment in 
Plus gross investment in consumer 
Equals gross domestic investment 
Less depreciation of private capital 
Less depreciation of government capital 
Less depreciation of consumer durables 
reproducible capital 
durables 
Equals net domestic investment 
Investment 
639.9  661.1 
187.1  ... 
347.0 
1,174.0  661.1 
380.1  437.2 
97.1  ... 
291.0  ... 
405.8  223.9 
”Rent equals opportunity cost plus depreciation. We  assume a constant real interest rate 
of  3 percent in calculating opportunity cost for government capital and consumer du- 
rables. We apply this discount rate to mid-year stocks for year t obtained by averaging 
the end-of-year stocks for years rand t - 1. Because the return on government enterprise 
capital is, at least in theory, already included in GNP, we do not include imputed rent 
on government enterprise capital in our expanded measures of government consumption 
and GNP. For further discussion, see Martin, Landefeld, and Peskin (1982). All depre- 
ciation estimates used in the adjusted calculations are the authors’, as described in secs. 
6.2 and 6.4 
bThis entry includes private equipment and nonresidential  and residential structures. 
Consumer durables are listed separately. Inventories are assumed not to depreciate. The 
adjusted estimate is from the authors’ calculations, while the “traditional” entry is the 
NIPA capital consumption allowance. 
‘In  the adjusted calculations, gross investment data for fixed reproducible capital and 
consumer durables are from the 1986 BEA wealth data tape, with our conversion to 1985 
dollars based on BEA price indices. These series differ slightly from the NIPA series 
from which  they  are derived because  of  adjustments for intersectoral transfers, for 
instance. Most of the difference between the gross private investment series presented 
here is in equipment. Government inventory investment is measured as the change in 
year-end stocks, based on BEA data converted to 1985 dollars. Government gross in- 
vestment in land is based on estimates of  yearly net acquisitions (see sec. 6.8 for a 
discussion of our land estimates) and does not include revaluations. 
Government consumption likewise is slightly different from govern- 
ment  purchases of  goods and services, as the rent on government 
capital was about $20 billion smaller than government gross investment. 
Private consumption, however, is quite close to NIPA personal con- 
sumption expenditures, as the estimated rental flow of services from 
the stock of consumer durables in 1985 (but not in general) is close to 
gross investment in durables.  To  total gross investment, we add ap- 
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billion of consumer durable investment. Thus, total gross investment 
is almost 80 percent larger than gross private investment as traditionally 
reported in the NIPA. Using our depreciation estimates, both for tra- 
ditional private investment and for government capital and consumer 
durables, yields adjusted net national investment of $406 billion, also 
80 percent larger than the NIPA figures. 
Turning to saving, gross saving substantially  exceeds NIPA gross 
private saving, about $1.1 trillion compared to $551 billion. NIPA net 
saving of $1 14 billion is only about one-third of our adjusted net saving. 
Corresponding  differences  would  be  found in  saving, investment, 
and consumption rates, although recall that NNP and GNP are slightly 
larger than the NIPA figures, so the proportionate increases would be 
slightly less. Table 6.7 presents estimates of U.S.  saving and investment 
from  1951  to  1985, using our  adjusted accounts, as percentages of 
adjusted GNP. For the three decades from  1951 to 1980, we present 
simple averages of annual figures for the decade.24 
The data reveal some interesting trends in total net saving and total 
net investment in the United States. Total net saving, while substantially 
higher  than  the  traditional  NIPA  figures, has  declined  substantially 
relative to the 1950s and 1960s. It declined about 15 percent between 
the 1950s and 1960s, on the one hand, and the 1970s, on the other, and 
has deteriorated markedly in the 1980s. By  1985, the third year of an 
expansion, the total net saving rate, expanded to include government 
saving and saving in the form of consumer durables, was almost 40 
percent below the average for the 1950s and 1960s. Net private saving 
(also substantially larger than the corresponding NIPA figures because 
of the inclusion of net saving in consumer durables) was only slightly 
below historical levels in  1984-85.  Net government saving, however, 
which averages a substantial fraction of  GNP in the 1950s and 1960s 
and a modest fraction in the 1970s, turned negative from 1982 to 1985. 
Federal government net  saving turned  sharply  negative and more 
than offset state and local government saving. Note here that saving is 
defined to adjust the traditional  surplus or deficit figures for net in- 
vestment. It is interesting to note, for example, that, while the federal 
government borrowed  4.4 percent of adjusted GNP in  1985, federal 
government net investment was estimated as 1.4 percent of GNP, about 
one-third of  the deficit figure. Whether the value of  these assets the 
federal government  was accumulating is properly measured  by  pur- 
chase price and  should be  thought  of  as representing a substantial 
available set of  public assets to offset the growing public liabilities 
represented by the deficits is a question we do not address here. 
The state and local government sector has always been a large net 
saver. In the period  1951-80,  this was primarily because of  net  in- 
vestment,  for  example,  in  educational  buildings.  In  the  1980s, the Table 6.7  Adjusted U.S. Saving and Investment, 1951-85 (as a percent of expanded GNP  and taken from current 
dollar calculations) 
1951-60  1961-70  1971-80  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Total net saving 
Net private saving 
Net government saving 
Federal government  saving 
Federal government  net investment 
Federal government  surplus 
State-local government saving 
State-local government net investment 
State-local government surplus 
Total net investment 
Net foreign investment 
National domestic investment 
Private domestic investment 
Government net investment 
Federal government net investment 
State-local government net investment 
Memo: Gross national saving 
Gross private saving 
Gross government saving 
Total capital consumption 
Private capital consumption 
Government capital consumption 
Federal government capital consumption 
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9.9  8.0 
9.3  7.6 
.7  .4 
-1.1  -1.1 
.5  .7 
-1.6  -1.9 
1.8  1.5 
1  .o  .5 
.8  1  .o 
9.9  8.1 
-  1.1  -  .1 
11.0  8.2 
9.5  6.9 
1.5  1.3 
.5  .7 
1  .o  .5 
26.2  25.4 
23.5  22.9 
2.7  2.5 
16.3  17.4 
14.2  15.4 
2.1  2.1 
1  .o  1.0 
1.1  1.1 
5.2 
6.6 
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7.2 
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1.4 

















1  .0 
-  1.9 
Nore: Our adjustments to NIPA measures to better account for government capital and consumer durables are described in the source 
note to table 6.5  and in the text. Here we use current dollar data and present our saving, investment, and capital consumption series as 
percentages of expanded GNP, i.e., NIPA GNP expanded to include rental flows from general government capital and consumer durables. 
For the three decades from 1951 to 1980, we present simple averages of  annual figures for the decade. 
Government saving equals the traditionally measured budget balance plus government net investment in reproducible capital and land. 
Our net investment estimates and the capital consumption figures reported use our estimates of the depreciation of  government capital, 
fixed private capital, and consumer durables; the latter is included here in “private capital consumption.” 313  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
pattern has changed. Net investment by  state and local governments 
has fallen to one-third of its earlier historical level, perhaps desirably 
so in view of changing demographics. Counteracting this has been the 
swing to a very substantial state and local surplus, although the latter 
is heavily concentrated in pension plans, whose simultaneously accru- 
ing liabilities are not accounted for in these data. 
Net investment in the United States has been more stable than na- 
tional saving. Domestic investment was actually a higher fraction of 
national  product  in  the  1970s  than  in  the  1960s. The  net  domestic 
investment rate in 1984-85  was only 14 percent below its level from 
1951  to  1980, compared with a 32 percent drop in net  saving rates. 
Making up for much of  the savings decline, of course, has been the 
substantial decline in net foreign investment (due both to a decrease 
in U.S. investment abroad and an increase in foreign investment in the 
United States), the other side of the trade deficit. Over 20 percent of 
domestic investment was financed from abroad in 1984-85. 
Government net investment in  1985 was about at the same ratio of 
national income as it was over the previous three decades, although 
state and  local government net  investment  had fallen  substantially. 
Federal government net investment heavily reflects the military buildup; 
in 1985, federal investment was at a level not attained since the 1950s. 
It is worth mentioning that gross saving and investment rates were 
in the low to mid-20 percent range with the expanded definitions, with 
total capital consumption having risen from 15-16 percent in the 1951- 
80 period to 17-18  percent in the 1980s. Two-thirds of  the difference 
between the net  saving rates in the  1960s  and those in the  1980s is 
attributable to an increased rate of capital consumption. A similar rise 
is reported in the NIPAs, but the gross saving, gross investment, and 
depreciation  figures are all  substantially  higher under the expanded 
definitions. 
We  present, in table 6.8, estimates of gross and net saving rates on 
various adjusted bases. We  start with the traditional NIPA basis, show 
the  rates  on an OECD basis  (including government nonmilitary in- 
vestment  but neither government military investment nor consumer 
durables), and move to broader definitions. While the trends in these 
rates are important, perhaps at least as important is the fact that tra- 
ditional comparisons between the United  States and other countries 
are marred by numerous comparability problems, among the most im- 
portant of which is the differential role played by government relative 
to private  capital formation  and  net  investment,  especially  military 
investment, on the one hand and consumer durable purchases on the 
other. These comparisons are particularly misleading with respect to 
Japan (see Boskin and Roberts 1986). Table 6.8  Gross and Net Saving Rates, Selected Years 
Gross National SavingGNP 
Exclude  Include Government 
Government  Include Government  Nonmilitary 
Nonmilitary  Nonmilitary  Investment in Fixed 
Investment and  Investment in Fixed  Reproducible Capital  All Government 
Consumer Durables  Reproducible Capital  and Consumer  Investment and 
(NIPA basis)  (OECD basis)  Durables  Consumer Durables 
1950  17.8 
1960  15.0 
1970  13.8 
1980  16.4 
















Net National SavingiNNP 
1950  11.7 
1960  8.2 
1970  6.2 
1980  7.7 
















Note: These estimates are derived from our 1985 constant dollar adjustment of  the NIPAs to account for 
government capital and consumer durables. Denominators (GNP and NNP for gross and net saving rates, 
respectively) in each column have been expanded to include the rental flows associated with the types of 
government investment included in the numerator. The depreciation estimates used are from our calcu- 
lations, as described earlier. For this reason, the net saving rates reported here in col. 1 differ from those 
calculated from NIPA data, which obviously use the NIPA capital consumption allowance instead. 315  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
As the data in table 6.9 and Figure 6.10 reveal, private consumption 
as a share of NNP has risen from 62.9 percent in 1950 and 63.7 percent 
in  1960 to 69.0 percent in 1985. This 6 percentage point rise-about  a 
10 percent increase-is  close to the volume of traditional net private 
saving. Had private consumption remained at its 1950-60  ratio and the 
government sector been unchanged, net private saving would have been 
almost doubled in 1985. 
Government consumption, as shown in  figure 6.11,  remains  about 
25 percent of NNP throughout the 1950s and 1960s but has since de- 
clined to only 21.3 percent by  1985. This aggregate marks a 10 per- 
centage  point  decline in  federal  government consumption since the 
Korean War (despite the growth of the government capital stock) and 
a 4 percentage point rise in state and local government consumption. 
The former heavily  reflects  the growth of  federal transfer payments 
(which by the mid-1970s exceeded purchases of goods and services) 
and the latter the demographic pressure of the baby boom on govern- 
ment spending on education. 
The share of  NNP devoted to national consumption has risen from 
about 86 percent in 1950 to over 90 percent by 1985. Though the con- 
sumption ratio has fluctuated substantially, partly for cyclical reasons, 
the continued upward trend is marked. 
While the share of  national  product devoted to consumption has 
risen,  the government’s  role  in  the trend  is  complex. While  direct 
government consumption has fallen, part of the increase in the private 
consumption rate undoubtedly reflects the incentives created by grow- 
ing government transfer payment programs and by tax policies. Thus, 
the decline in the national saving rate alluded to earlier reflects both 
the growth of  the private consumption ratio, partly resulting from gov- 
ernment transfer payment  growth, and the decline in the net saving 
rate of the government sector-indeed,  its shift to net dissaver-re- 
sulting both from historically large federal deficits and from the decline 
in state and local government net investment. 
Table 6.9  Private, Government, and National Consumption as Percentage of 
Expanded NNP, Selected Years 
Private  Government  Consumption/NNP  National 
Consumption/  Consumption/ 
NNP  Total  Federal  State-Local  NNP 
1950  62.9  23.5  13.8  9.7  86.4 
1960  63.7  25.1  14.4  10.7  88.8 
1970  65.4  25.6  12.7  12.9  91.0 
1980  67.9  22.0  8.6  13.4  89.8 
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Fig. 6.10  Adjusted  private consumption as a percentage of  expanded 
net national product 
6.6  Government Financial Assets and Liabilities 
The federal debt receives enormous attention from the press and 
public. Little noticed is that governments also hold substantial financial 
assets as well as off-budget liabilities. Though, as Boskin (1982) argues, 
the appropriate definition of  deficits depends on the question being 
asked, the conventional measures of debt and deficits are not accurate 
answers to almost any of them. 
The Federal Reserve’s flow-of-funds  accounts present balance sheets 
with financial assets and liabilities for both the federal and the state 
and local governments. As Eisner and Pieper (1984) point out, these 
figures should be adjusted to reflect their market, rather than the par, 
value. They make a series of careful adjustments to the various com- 
ponents on the balance sheet.25  Eisner (1986) updates the par-to-market 
conversions and extends them to state and local governments. The 
conversion factors are particularly  large during periods of increasing 
inflation and interest rates, like 1980.26 
Financial assets and liabilities in 1985 are presented for both levels 
of  government in table 6.10. We  have made only Eisner and Pieper’s 
par-to-market corrections to the flow-of-funds  The federal 
government Bad  more than $1 trillion in financial assets. More than 317  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Percentage 
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Fig. 6.11  Government consumption  as a percentage of  expanded net 
national product 
half  these were loans, but  there  was also more  than  $140 billion in 
cash, time deposits, and gold. Conventional debt also understates li- 
abilities, which include more than $250 billion in agency debt. State 
and local government financial assets exceeded $450 billion and were 
within $100 billion of their financial liabilities. Nearly half of state and 
local financial assets were federal government liabilities. 
Figures 6.12 and 6.13 show the trends in financial assets and liabilities 
for the two sectors in 1985 dollars. Federal financial liabilities fell rap- 
idly after the war, then changed relatively little in real terms through 
1981. At the same time, federal financial assets were gradually rising 
in real terms. The difference, called by Eisner the “net debt,” was less 
than $600 billion in  1980, only slightly above its postwar low. In the 
last few years, of course, federal liabilities have exploded, and in  1985 
they exceeded the 1945 peak for the first time. Since financial assets 
grew by only 10 percent, the net debt, as shown in table 6.11 ,  grew by 
145 percent. 
State and local government financial liabilities grew more  rapidly 
than financial assets through 1971. Liabilities fell sharply in real terms 
in the late 1970s, while financial assets continued their steady growth, 
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Sources: Par-to-market indices kindly provided by Paul Pieper and described in an ap- 
pendix to Eisner (1986) were applied to end-of-year 1985 data on government financial 
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Table 6.11  Net Debt and Change in Net Debt for Federal and State-Local 
Governments (billions of  1985 dollars) 
Federal  Change in  State-  Change in 
Net  Federal  Local  State-Local 
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Sources: Net debt is defined by Eisner as the excess of government financial liabilities 
over financial assets. Current dollar series on the estimated market value of government 
financial liabilities and assets for 1945-84  are taken from Eisner (1986) and converted 
into  1985 dollars via the GNP deflator. The differences in these series for federal and 
state-local governments are reported here as net debt. Estimates for 1985 are from table 
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6.7  Government Oil and Gas Mineral Rights 
Governments own a large fraction of the mineral rights in the United 
States. Federal and state governments own all mineral rights on off- 
shore and tidal lands. In addition, all levels own the mineral rights 
under government land. For consistent accounting, the value of these 
assets should be counted as wealth, and revenues from government- 
owned lands should be charged as sales of the assets. 
Oil and gas rights are by far the most valuable to the government 
sector, though other minerals, particularly coal, may be more valuable 
in  some states. For the federal government, we correct, update, and 
convert to 1985 dollars the estimates of the value of oil and gas rights 
made by Boskin et al. (1985).28 
When a government leases the mineral rights in a particular area- 
rights essentially to as yet undiscovered resources-it  has reduced its 
mineral wealth by transferring claims to part of it to the private sector. 
In return, the government receives some payment immediately in the 
form of a bonus, with the rest of the payments deferred as royalties or 
rental payments. Bonuses are cash payments that are not conditional 
on the existence or size of the resource and are typically the variable 
subject to bidding. Royalty payments are fractions, usually fixed in 
advance, of the gross revenue of the produced output, if  any. By the 
time reserves are “proven,” their only value to the government is the 
present value of royalties they represent.29 
The method used by Boskin et al. (1985) takes advantage of several 
institutional and theoretical characteristics of  oil and gas production 
to value federal oil and gas rights with the limited information avail- 
able.30  The base-year value of oil and gas rights to the government is 
the  sum of  three  components: future royalties on proven reserves, 
future royalties  on estimated undiscovered reserves, and future bo- 
nuses  on unleased  land. Fortunately,  royalties  are historically  fixed 
percentages of  the gross revenues.  Since the percentage is  known, 
forecasting royalties  requires forecasting production and prices.  By 
definition, expected future production, with current prices and tech- 
nology, is the sum of  proven and estimated undiscovered reserves. 
Since oil and gas are exhaustible resources, there are theoretical, as 
well as empirical, reasons to expect increasing real prices. Boskin et 
al. assume that real prices will grow at the real rate of  interest since 
this is both convenient and roughly consistent with historical evidence 
and theory.31  Bonuses on unleased land are assumed to be proportional 
to royalties on undiscovered resources. 
Boskin et al. (1985) obtain the value of federal oil and gas rights in 
other years by making two additional assumptions. First, the quantity 
of  oil and gas reserves changes only with prod~ction.~~  Second, the 
expected future price path at any date is proportional to actual prices 322  M. J. BoskinJM. S. RobinsonlA. M. Huber 
at that date.33  With these assumptions, capital gains or losses are pro- 
portional to price changes, and the change in  value from year to year 
is the capital gain less bonuses and royalties received. 
The corrected values of federal oil and gas rights, converted to 1985 
dollars using the GNP deflator, are given in table 6.12. The magnitudes 
are enormous, particularly after the second oil shock. The 1980 value 
Table 6.U  Value of Federal Oil and Gas Mineral Rights (billions of 
1985 dollars) 
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-  156.7 
Sources: The value of oil and gas rights for 1981 was obtained from estimates of proven 
and undiscovered, but economically recoverable, reserves on federal land, 1981 prices, 
royalty rates, and historic ratios of  bonuses to future royalties. The values for other 
years were obtained by adjusting for bonuses and royalties paid and price changes. A 
detailed description of the methodology and underlying assumptions, as well as  sensitivity 
analyses, is given in Boskin et al. (1985). The series was converted to 1985 dollars using 
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is the largest of any single asset on the federal balance sheet, substan- 
tially higher than structures, gold, mortgages, or inventories. It is al- 
most as large as the net federal debt in that year. Even after the dramatic 
drop in  world oil prices, we estimate the value of  federal oil and gas 
rights exceeded one-third of a trillion dollars in  1986. As figure 6.14 
shows, changes in  the value of federal rights can also be large, occa- 
sionally exceeding the conventionally measured budget deficit. Some 
volatility is appropriate since the method is designed to give a contem- 
poraneous estimate of the value of mineral rights. 
Before turning to state and local mineral rights, let  us add some 
caveats. Our calculations are sensitive to estimates of  undiscovered, 
economically recoverable reserves. As shown in Boskin et al. (1985), 
the value of oil and gas rights could be up to 39 percent higher or 29 
percent lower if one took the 5 percent or 95 percent bounds calculated 
by the U.S. Geological Survey (1981). The estimates are also sensitive 
to the assumptions on price 
Since state and local governments do not appear, for the most part, 
to keep records on either production or reserves on state-owned lands, 
it is difficult to make estimates of the value of oil and gas rights for 
them. We have obtained information from three states that account for 
more than 60 percent of U.S.  oil production and a higher fraction of 
Billions 
Of 1985 $S 
1-11  --  Total 
500 
.x-  Natural Gas 
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the  value  of  state-owned  oil  and  gas  rights:  Alaska,  Texas,  and 
California.  35 
By far the most valuable oil and gas rights are owned by the state 
of  Alaska. More than 99 percent of Alaska’s production is on state- 
owned land; this compares to an estimated 6.5 percent for Texas and 
1.8 percent for California.36 Since essentially all Alaska’s production 
is on state-owned land, it is artificial to treat taxes on petroleum dif- 
ferently from royalties. If  the severance tax rate were lower, for ex- 
ample,  royalty  rates  could  be  raised  by  the  same  amount  without 
changing production or state revenues. Even the corporate tax on oil 
companies should be viewed as payment for oil rights; oil companies 
pay more than 90 percent of corporate income taxes, and the formula 
for calculating the base was changed to maximize the take from the oil 
producers.37  Accordingly, we include all petroleum taxes and royalties 
as part of the value of rights. 
In 1985, Alaska’s revenues from petroleum were $3.1 billion, or $4.64 
per barrel produced. Alaska had 7.1 billion barrels of  proven oil re- 
serves, so, under the price growth assumption of  Boskin et al. (1985), 
these alone  were  worth  at least  $32.9 billion in  1985.38  Alaska was 
estimated to have  6.9 billion barrels  of  undiscovered,  economically 
recoverable oil onshore. If this was all on state land, the value of  oil 
rights would have been $65 billion in  1985. Finally, the state was es- 
timated to have 71  trillion cubic feet of  natural gas either proven or 
undiscovered. If the value to the state of 10,000 cubic feet of gas were 
the same as a barrel of oil, this would make the total value of Alaskan 
oil and gas rights $98 billion in  1985.39 
By comparison to Alaska, even Texas looks small. The average roy- 
alty rate on state-owned land was  12 percent, and the severance tax 
rates were 4.6 percent for oil and 7.5 percent for gas.40  If  the reserve- 
to-production ratio is the same on private and state-owned land, the 
value of  proven reserves of oil and gas on state land in 1985 was $2.2 
and $1.6 billion, re~pectively.~’  If state land contains the same fraction 
of undiscovered reserves as of production, the total value of Texas’s 
oil and gas rights was roughly $12 billion in  1985.42 
Since California has much smaller proven and estimated undiscov- 
ered reserves, and since the state owns a much smaller fraction of those 
reserves, the value of California’s rights is lower by an order of mag- 
nitude. The state collects an average royalty of 16.5  percent. Under Bos- 
kin et al.’ (1985) assumptions, the value of California’s oil and gas rights 
was $0.8 billion in  1985 if  the ratio of both undiscovered and proven 
reserves to production was the same on private and on state land. 
Our estimates of the total value of oil and gas rights in  1985 owned 
by the three states for which we have data is $110.8 billion. Using the 
method described  by  Boskin et al. (1985), we adjust for royalty and 325  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
bonus payments and price changes to create current dollar estimates 
for earlier years. Converting the estimate to 1985 dollars using the GNP 
deflator, we obtain an estimate for state oil and gas rights in  1980 of 
$125 billion. We  wish to stress, however, that data limitations forced 
several assumptions about the quantity and value of  oil and gas re- 
serves, both proven and undiscovered, on state land. In addition, we 
are limited to three states-the  most important omission being Loui- 
siana-and,  because of a lack of  royalty data, to the 1980s. Our 1980 
estimate of the value of state oil and gas rights exceeds our figures for 
the value of any single category of financial asset on the state and local 
balance  sheet or the  value of  state and local residential  structures, 
equipment, and inventories combined. 
6.8  Government Land 
Governmental units own substantial amounts of land in the United 
States, with the federal government alone holding nearly one-third of 
the nation’s land area. In this section, we present annual estimates of 
the value of  federal and state-local land from  1946 to 1985.43  The es- 
timates for  1946-51  are taken from Goldsmith (1962) and those for 
1952-68 from Milgram (1973). Our contribution is to update these series 
from 1969 forward. In doing this, we follow Milgram’s basic method- 
ology, with some modifications. 
Unfortunately, the data available on acreage and market values of 
government land are incomplete, especially for state and local govern- 
ments, and not entirely reliable. Like Goldsmith and Milgram, we use 
these data to update estimates made for 1946 by  Reeve et al. (1950), 
and more current and more rigorously derived benchmark estimates 
are desirable. These limitations restrict the degree of confidence that 
can be placed in any estimate of government land values. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) publishes estimates of 
rural and urban acreage owned by the federal government and its orig- 
inal acquisition cost in its annual Summary Report of  Real Property 
Owned  by the  United States  throughout  the  World. These data are 
compiled from detailed inventory reports submitted by federal agen- 
cies. In  1985, the GSA estimated that the federal government owned 
723.0 million acres of  rural land and 3.7 million acres of  urban land, 
which had a total acquisition cost of $12.9 billion. Given the significant 
share of national wealth accounted for by land, it is perhaps surprising 
that there is not a large body of carefully derived data on land prices. 
We  construct a price index for federal rural land that gives equal weight 
to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s estimated average value of 
farmland and to stumpage prices paid for timber harvested in national 
forests. Our price index for federal urban land is based on the average 326  M. J. BoskinlM. S. RobinsonlA. M. Huber 
site price per square foot of one-family homes purchased with Federal 
Housing Administration  (FHA)-insured  mortgages.  We  estimate the 
value of federal urban and rural land in each year by applying our price 
index for each to the corresponding GSA acreage series.44 
In table 6.13, we present estimates of federal, state-local, and total 
government land values for 1946-85.  We  have used the GNP deflator 
to convert the estimates drawn from Goldsmith (1962), Milgram (1973), 
and our calculations into 1985 dollars. We  estimate the value of federal 
land in 1985 at $231.3 billion, with urban land accounting for more than 
three-fourths of the total value despite the fact that it constitutes only 
0.5 percent of total acreage. (For a breakdown of the total federal land 
stock into rural and urban components, see table 6.14, and, for a chart 
of government land values, fig. 6.15.) The sizable increase in the federal 
total from $99.4 billion in  1968 results from an increase of about  160 
percent in urban acreage, which is far more valuable than rural land, 
and from increases in both our land price indices that exceed the general 
inflation rate. The real value of federal urban land more than triples 
over 1968-85,  and most of the increase occurs in 1970-74 and 1979- 
81. The rural land series primarily reflects price changes, and it in- 
creases gradually until the late 1970s and early 1980s and then decreases 
sharply. Our 1985 total value estimate is 8 percent lower than the peak 
attained in 1981.4s 
Less information is available on land owned by state and local gov- 
ernments; there are neither estimates of total acreage nor a breakdown 
between rural and urban components. Yet the significance of these land 
holdings is indicated by  Milgram’s finding that they  were more than 
three times as valuable as federal land in  1968. Thus, it is important 
to update the previous work on state and local government land also. 
Here we follow Milgram’s methodology almost exactly, partly because 
a paucity of data constrains us from doing otherwise. We  construct one 
price index for all state and local land that gives equal weight to U.S. 
Department of Agriculture average farmland values and to the average 
site price per square foot of homes purchased with FHA-insured  mort- 
gages. To estimate acquisitions, we use a Census Bureau data series 
on state and local governments’ “capital outlays for land and existing 
structures.” Lacking other information, we follow Milgram in reducing 
these values  by  10 percent  to adjust both  for the  value of  existing 
structures located on these lands that are purchased for continuing use 
and for sales of state and local government land, which are not reported 
separately in  the data provided  in the Census Bureau’s annual Gov- 
ernmental Finances. We  use this net acquisitions series A,  and our price 
series P, to calculate the value of state and local land  V,  as 327  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S 
Table 6.13  Estimates of  Government Land Values (billions of  1985 dollars) 

































































































































































Sources:  Government  land  value estimates for 1946-51,  1952-68,  and  1969-85  were 
obtained from Goldsmith (1962), Milgram (1973), and our updating of Milgram’s esti- 
mates,  repectively, with all estimates converted from current dollars into 1985 dollars 
by the GNP deflator. 328  M. J. BoskinIM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
Table 6.14  Value of  Federal Land:  Rural,  Urban, and Total (billions of 
1985 dollars) 

























































































































Estimated  values of state and local government land are found in 
column 2 of table 6.13. Our 1985 market value is $580.5 billion. As can 
be seen in figure 6.15, the value of this land grows steadily at a slightly 
increasing rate between  1968 and 1981. This reflects real increases in 
average land prices and yearly net acquisitions of  1-2  percent of the 
stock. Since 1981, the value of  state and local land has decreased a 
total of  18 percent, as a significant decrease in nominal farmland values 
and a leveling off in urban land values have caused our composite price 
index to decrease. 
6.9  Contingent Liabilities 
The federal government and closely allied federally sponsored agen- 
cies engage in  activities that generate contingent liabilities (and also 329  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the US. 
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assets) for the government. The most important of these are loans, 
loan guarantees, and deposit insurance. The recent developments in 
real  estate,  agriculture,  energy,  and  less-developed-country  loans 
threaten the solvency of the two major deposit insurance programs- 
the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal 
Savings and  Loan Insurance  Corporation (FSLIC). The agricultural 
debt crisis has already brought the Farm Credit System, a federally 
regulated and sponsored financial intermediary, to Congress for emer- 
gency financial relief. Agricultural loan guarantees by the Farm Home 
Administration are in the process of major default and substantial fed- 
eral payouts.  Other federal insurance programs of questionable sol- 
vency include the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation and social 
security. We  discuss social security in the next section. 
The exact nature and extent of these federal liabilities and those of 
the smaller but often analogous state and local insurance program li- 
abilities are unclear. Various statements have been made that provide 
estimates of  the "maximum"  exposure or risk or potential liabilities 
of the federal government. For example, the federal government pub- 
lishes annually a document showing total insured deposits. Arthur An- 
derson and Company (1986) presents estimates of  the maximum risk 330  M. J. BoskinIM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
exposure in  notes appended to a government balance  sheet. But as 
documented in  Boskin,  Barham, et al. (1987), the history of deposit 
insurance has been primarily one in which the uninsured deposits are 
insured as well. These amount to 30 percent of all bank deposits. But 
it is also unlikely that a severe financial crisis would result in  such 
payoffs. It is only imaginable in a state of the world in which the entire 
economy is in chaos and the government is forced to resort to hyper- 
inflation to pay its debts. 
On the other hand, current budgetary treatment of deposit insurance, 
loans, and guarantees is misleading and inaccurate. There is no sense 
of  accrual accounting, usually only net spending (net of  revenues) is 
reported, there is no separate capital account, and there is no adjust- 
ment from par to market value. Still, it is helpful to have some rough 
idea of  the size and nature of  these contingent liabilities. Table 6.15 
presents  postwar  time-series  data  on  the  total  outstanding-at  par 
value-of direct loans, loan guarantees, and federally sponsored en- 
terprise debt. It should be emphasized that the total outstanding figures 
not only are at par value but  also include some double counting as 
there are secondary guarantees. To avoid the double counting, a rough 
rule would be that 20 or 25 percent of the total outstanding in the recent 
years are secondary guarantees. 
Each year  new commitments amount to a tremendous volume of 
lending and guaranteeing. For example, in 1986, new commitments of 
loan guarantees were almost $300 billion. Of this total, the overwhelm- 
ing bulk were renewing previously extended guarantees that had ex- 
pired. The total outstanding year-to-year changes reflect the net new 
commitments. These figures do not include deposit insurance or social 
security. Of  these hundreds of billions in outstanding loans and guar- 
antees, what is a sensible estimate of  the contingent liability of  the 
federal government? It  is  clearly  implausible that all the loans will 
default with probability one, so the total outstanding amounts are a 
substantial upper bound (although Bartlett  1983 adds them to the reg- 
ular national debt). While some loans are ultimately forgiven and cost 
the government the original amount, many are repaid completely. The 
likely course of future repayments will reflect various factors, including 
economic conditions such as commodity prices, interest rates, the level 
of real economic activity, and the like. 
It is possible to develop a life-cycle projection of new loan guarantee 
commitments to determine, on the basis of  longitudinal data, the net 
spending equivalent in present value terms that is likely to occur per 
dollar of new commitments of loan guarantees and correspondingly for 
direct loans and agency debt. While in some contingencies the histor- 
ically based data might prove to be exceedingly inaccurate, it is po- 
tentially useful to develop some insight into the historical pattern of 331  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
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Table 6.15  Total Outstanding for Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees in 
Millions of Dollars at Par Value, 1952-86 
Federally 
Loan  Sponsored 
Direct Loans,  Outstanding  Outstanding 
Guarantees, Total  Enterprises, Total 
Year  Total Outstanding  (Gross)  (Gross)" 
1952  14,020  24,384  2,945 
1953  15,656  35,052  3,003 
1954  14,740  40,460  3,014 
1955  16,088  45,392  3,602 
1956  17,116  5 1,097  4,292 
1957  17,503  55,939  5,578 
1958  18,454  58,515  5,947 
1959  22,458  63,337  7,446 
1960  22,579  67,263  9,106 
1961  23,932  71,849  9,545 
1962  27,264  76,967  11,296 
1963  29,459  81,461  11,600 
1964  3 1,326  85,645  13,568 
1965  33,054  91,414  15,331 
1966  32,997  99,225  19,390 
1967  42,208  99,500  19,040 
1968  5 1,799  108.07  1  22,883 
1969  46,856  117,703  26,955 
1970  5 1,078  125,514  37,515 
1971  53,156  143,549  38,939 
1972  50,149  l65,7 13  43,322 
1973  43,891  183,292  54,816 
1974  46,132  197,159  71,160 
1975  49,777  218,273  84,635 
1976  53,404  243,2 13  90,788 
TR  54,220  247,816  93,598 
1977  67,637  284,289  101,902 
1978  76,526  317,292  129,987 
1979  82,972  387,172  163,575 
1980  91,663  454,725  195,807 
1981  91,287  505,405  231,417 
1982  100,220  547,327  275,361 
1983  223,000  519,646  261  ,OOO 
1984  229,300  565,528  314,100 
1985  257,400  613,101  369,940 
1986  251,600  691,921  453,300 
Source: Boskin, Barham, et al. (1987). 
aThe federally sponsored enterprises are the Federal National Mortgage Association, the 
Federal Home Loan Banks, Federal Land Banks, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Cor- 
poration,  the Federal Intermediate Credit Banks, Banks for Cooperatives, and the Stu- 
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actual government spending and support of guarantees and loans. Bos- 
kin, Barham, et al. (1987) present an analytic schema and apply it to 
longitudinal data on cohorts of  loan guarantees for government agen- 
cies, especially the Small Business Administration, and they estimate 
that, for each dollar of new commitment, the present value of ultimate 
spending in support of that commitment is approximately twelve cents. 
If-and  it is a big if-such  a figure could be applied to other programs, 
a rough estimate of the likely value of the ultimate federal government 
liability based on the value of the loans would be about 12 percent of 
the figures reported in table 6.15, about $30 billion dollars in support 
of loans, $80 billion in  support of  loan guarantees, and perhaps $50 
billion in support of federally sponsored enterprises in  1985. There are 
a variety of reasons to believe that the  12 percent figure may be too 
low or too high in various circumstances for different kinds of lending 
activity, but we mention this only because it has become somewhat 
fashionable either to ignore these contingent liabilities or to report them 
as the maximum risk exposure or the total value outstanding, as if that 
figure were readily comparable to, say, the privately held regular na- 
tional debt. Clearly, that procedure is inappropriate. 
Deposit insurance raises similar, though in  some ways more subtle 
and more quantitatively important, issues. First, the nature of the bank- 
ing deposit insurance system is that the risks are systematically cor- 
related  to a much greater extent than  in  other federal government 
lending programs. There is a small probability of extremely high pay- 
outs. But even defining the maximum exposure of  the FDIC or the 
FSLIC is questionable. The Treasury counts total insured deposits. 
But that exceeds by a factor of at least fifty the properly measured net 
worth of the FDIC or the FSLIC. By  law, the FDIC and the FSLIC 
(and several other smaller analogous organizations) have a line of credit 
at the Treasury, but this line of credit is quite modest. Does the Treasury 
and/or the Federal Reserve stand behind all insured deposits? All de- 
posits? Or only the amount in the funds plus the standby borrowing 
authority at the Treasury? Total deposits at insured banks were $I .974 
trillion+oincidently,  about the size of the privately held national debt- 
in  1985, whereas the insured amounts were $1.503 trillion. The total 
assets of the FDIC were $26.4 billion in  1985, and the standby bor- 
rowing authority at the Treasury $3 billion. 
The FDIC and the FSLIC are technically independent agencies, so 
they could legally default on their liabilities without giving their cred- 
itors a claim on the Treasury. Clearly, the potential  liabilities of  the 
FDIC  and the FSLIC  substantially  exceed  their assets in  bad-case 
scenarios. What is a sensible expected present value to put forth for 
such contingent liabilities? Surely, they are substantially less than either 
the total deposits insured at institutions or the total insured deposits. 
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pected payouts in each period to obtain an appropriate loss reserve as 
the best single number to provide as a contingent liability. This would 
depend not only on future economic conditions but also on the inter- 
pretation of the various rules, laws, and political decisions concerning 
backing the thrift industry. Rather than present a time series of esti- 
mates, we refer the interested reader to Boskin, Barham, et al. (1987) 
for analytic discussion and report in the balance sheets presented in 
section 6.11 alternative estimates of these contingent liabilities of  the 
deposit insurance system. 
As noted above, state and local governments also have various con- 
tingent obligations, including those to state-chartered banks, unfunded 
pension liabilities, and so on. We  raise these issues here but do not 
attempt to elaborate the analysis. 
6.10  Social Security 
Because the social security program looms so large in the financial 
picture of so many, and because, until recently, it has been more or 
less a pay-as-you-go system, the currently unfunded liabilities of the 
social security system at any point in time are usually large, subject 
to substantial variation depending on assumed patterns of  economic 
and demographic trends, and subject to enormous change with seem- 
ingly minor (relative to the intense debate over budget deficits and tax 
reform) changes in  rules relating to benefits or taxes.  It is not  our 
purpose here to review the voluminous literature concerning the po- 
tential effect of  social security “wealth”  on real economic activity, 
such as the savingkonsumption choice or retirement decisions.46 
How to define the expected obligations of the social security system 
is also a subject of much controversy. Under a closed-group approach, 
the expected future taxes and benefits paid by particular cohorts-for 
example, all those currently alive or currently above a certain age, 
such as eighteen-would  be calculated, discounted to the present, and 
compared. The difference between the expected present value of ben- 
efits and taxes would be the surplus or deficit. This concept, using 
current participants as the group, is adapted by Arthur Anderson and 
Company (1986). Under an open-group concept, the expected present 
value of benefits and taxes paid over some time period, often taken to 
be the seventy-five-year long-term actuarial projection  period of the 
Social Security Administration (SSA), would be compared, with the 
difference being the deficit or surplus. Thus, taxes paid in the early 
working years of  the currently unborn  and benefits paid to persons 
during retirement who are not yet in the labor force would be counted. 
While seventy-five years is an extremely long time period, and while 
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huge swings in the expected balances in social security, swings the size 
of the regular national debt, the time frame is somewhat arbitrary, as 
are the various assumptions involved. 
Table 6.16 presents estimates of the long-term actuarial deficit in the 
retirement and disability part of social security over the next seventy- 
five years under alternative economic and demographic scenarios (as 
developed by Boskin and Puffert  1987 and Boskin 1987). The annual 
amounts are adjusted for inflation and discounted to the present at a 
real discount rate of 2 percent (the interest rate assumed earned on 
social security balances by the Social Security Trustees). As can be 
seen, in the base case, the SSA's intermediate assumptions for eco- 
nomic and demographic trends over the next seventy-five years, there 
is a deficit of almost $0.5 trillion, slightly under 0.5 percent of  taxable 
payroll over the period. Under the SSA actuary's optimistic assump- 
tions, there is a $3.4 trillion surplus, while, under the overall pessimistic 
assumptions, there is a $2.6 trillion deficit. Thus, moving all the eco- 
nomic and demographic projections from intermediate to either opti- 
mistic or pessimistic results in a change that is larger than the privately 
held national debt. But all the assumptions do not have to change for 
there to be an enormous variation in the expected surplus. For example, 
leaving all the other assumptions aside and just adopting the high wage 
growth assumptions of the SSA actuaries results in a surplus of almost 
$900 billion, a $1.4 trillion increase over the base case. Adopting the 
low mortality assumption, holding all the other demographic assump- 
tions  and economic assumptions to those of  the intermediate case, 
results in a deficit of $1.7 trillion, a $1.2 trillion increase. 
The numbers revealed  in  table 6.16 are substantial, and social se- 
curity looms large in the lives of many Americans-there  are 37 million 
current beneficiaries and over 100 million taxpayers, the majority of 
Table 6.16  OASDI System Finances, Various Economic and Demographic 
Scenarios, Seventy-five-Year  Totals, 1986-2060  (billions of 1986 
dollars, discounted to 1986) 
Variation of Surplus 
Scenarios  Surplus  from Base Case 
Base case  -  495  0 
Overall optimistic for trust fund  3,389  3,884 
Overall pessimistic for trust fund  -  2,567  -  2,072 
High wage growth  878  1,373 
Low wage growth  -  948  -  453 
Low mortality  -  1,700  -  1,205 
Pay-as-you-go tax rates  0  495 
High mortality  468  963 
Benefit-ratchet-unfunded  -  3,690  -3,195 
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whom pay more in social security taxes than in income taxes. It would 
be surprising if there were no effects of these variations. However, the 
seventy-five-year period is somewhat arbitrary. The deficit occurs for 
a variety of reasons, not the least of which is the passage of the extra 
large baby boom generation into retirement, followed by the baby bust 
generation paying high tax rates to finance the benefits of the baby 
boom. The period beyond the seventy-five-year projections would be 
one of  surplus if  the benefits were raised no further and the high tax 
rates maintained as the ratio of workers to retirees edges upward as 
the baby bust generation retires.47 
For a variety of reasons, projections of social security deficits should 
be taken with a certain degree of caution. Not only are they enormously 
sensitive to these economic and demographic assumptions, about which 
reasonable  people might disagree, but future social security benefits 
are also not contractual obligations in  the same way as the regularly 
issued  national  debt. While the national debt is issued  in  bonds  of 
nominal dollar value and hence could be altered substantially by un- 
expected inflation, as emphasized by Eisner (1986), it is unlikely to be 
repudiated, even in part. Social security benefits and taxes and their 
difference, on the other hand, are really potential future obligations. 
They  can be  changed  by  congressional  action changing the  benefit 
formulae-for  example, changing the bend points in the retirement plan 
as proposed, but rejected, in the early 1980s; taxing all social security 
benefits, or half of them as was done in  1983; changing marginal tax 
rates in  the income tax, as was done in the Tax Reform Act of  1986; 
raising the age of eligibility for future social security beneficiaries, as 
was done in 1983 prospectively for the early twenty-first century, and 
so on. 
Another important issue surrounds the fact that for the first time 
social security retirement funds are projected to be  on a path  that 
deviates systematically from pay-as-you-go finance. Under pay-as-you- 
go finance, the long-term actuarial deficit in social security is identically 
zero, as each year’s benefits are paid by each year’s taxes, although 
they may not line up so evenly for a particular age group or income 
group or for families of different marital status. Concern about the long- 
run deficit really seems to be concern about whether taxes will be raised 
or benefits reduced when projections create a situation in which the 
two are likely to diverge systematically. For the old age and survivors 
insurance system, the real discounted value of  the projected surplus 
peaks around 2020 at almost $800  billion (see fig. 6.16), and several 
hundred billion dollars would be added by the disability fund. To pro- 
vide some insight into the possible  difference in  the social security 
retirement system’s long-run surplus, consider two scenarios: we use 
the temporary surplus to raise benefits without correspondingly raising 
taxes later on in the seventy-five-year period, or we revert to pay-as- 336  M. J. BoskinIM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
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Fig. 6.16  Old age and survivors insurance system projected  real dis- 
counted surplus for base case, annual and cumulative 
you-go finance by lowering tax rates during the period of the surplus. 
As the final two rows of table 6.16 reveal, the long-run actuarial deficit 
in the retirement part of the system increases to $3.7 trillion under the 
benefit-ratcheting-up case but is eliminated under the pay-as-you-go 
tax-rate-reduction case (in which tax rates are reduced during years of 
surplus and raised during the years of  deficits to restore the pay-as- 
you-go nature of the system). 
The hospital insurance system is projected to be in much worse shape 
than old age, survivors, and disability insurance (OASDI) (see fig. 6.17) 
because the tax rate for hospital insurance is fixed at 2.9 percent of 
taxable payroll while health care expenditures are growing, partly for 
demographic reasons and partly because of differential growth in health 
care costs versus general inflation. Even if the latter is brought under 
control, the demographics will cause the expenditures under the hos- 
pital insurance part of medicare to rise, so, when compared with slowly 
growing tax  revenues, the deficit must  widen.  Thus, over the next 
several decades the options for social security are accruing a surplus 
in the retirement and disability funds, dissipating it for other uses such 
as assigning some of the tax proceeds to medicare, and so on. 
For all these reasons we prefer to provide the supplemental infor- 
mation concerning social security as additional potential liabilities in 337  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Fig. 6.17  Projected social security finances under intermediate (IIB) 
assumptions 
any balance  sheet for the government sector. We  do not propose to 
add it to the regular national debt.48 
6.11  Government Balance Sheets 
With our estimates of government tangible and financial assets and 
liabilities, the temptation to create government balance sheets is irre- 
sistible. Before giving in, however, we must stress numerous caveats 
and cautions. 
While we  believe that  we have developed improved  estimates of 
tangible assets, each of the major categories of  assets and liabilities 
presents conceptual and measurement difficulties. The “net  worth” 
figures we shall present are, accordingly, subject to substantial error. 
Moreover, extremely important classes of liabilities-contingent  and 
potential-are  excluded, at least above the line, because, unlike finan- 
cial liabilities or assets, they are mostly not traded on a market or easily 
quantified with existing data and are subject to large uncertainty. Pre- 
senting rough estimates of contingent liabilities on loans, guarantees, 
and deposit insurance and potential liabilities in unfunded pension pro- 
grams (especially social security) “below  the line”  is  not  meant  to 338  M. J. BoskidM. S. RobinsodA. M. Huber 
suggest that they are less important than those included above the line. 
However, they are subject to different degrees of precision, contractual 
obligation, and conceptual estimation. Also, they are taken from other 
sources (although some are by Boskin). Of course, governments have 
enormous intangible assets, including the power to tax, so a negative 
net worth would not imply bankruptcy or imminent debt repudiation. 
Accordingly, our calculations, like similar ones by Eisner and Pieper 
(1984) and Eisner (1986), should probably be viewed as illustrative of 
trends rather than as accurate point estimates of net worth. 
Further, how to add up various components is by no means obvious. 
Finance theory tells us we should place greater value on future income 
streams that are negatively  correlated with other sources of income. 
Thus, if one concludes that the value of government mineral rights will 
rise substantially when oil prices accelerate sharply, and if  this is as- 
sociated with a deep recession or some other long-lived economic event, 
these revenues may be systematically negatively correlated with other 
sources of government revenue; and similar issues arise on the outlay 
side. The conceptually proper thing would be to apply a risk charge to 
the various components in  the various  time periods on the basis of 
subjective probability distributions of outcomes and estimates of  the 
risk tolerance (the reciprocal of the Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aver- 
sion) and to discount those charges to the present. We have not sought 
to do this here, but we do wish to emphasize that the variability  of 
likely future returns or outlays stemming from various  government 
activities is large, as it is for the private sector, and that there may also 
be systematic covariance among components that should be taken into 
account in establishing a balance sheet. 
Estimates of the real change in net worth have important, but still 
limited, uses. The net worth provides some indication of future tax 
liabilities.  When oil  was discovered in  Alaska, expected future tax 
liabilities of Alaskan residents dropped dramatically. 
Changes in  net worth indicate  what  legacy, in  the form of future 
government service net of tax liabilities, current generations are pro- 
viding future generations. Of course, this does not imply that the only 
ethical course is to leave net worth unchanged.  If future generations 
will be richer, or if  the current generation has made large sacrifices, 
as, for example, in World War 11, it may be entirely appropriate to pass 
tax burdens forward. 
Changes in net worth are not necessarily a good indicator of fiscal 
tightness.  But  information on conventional  deficits  may usefully  be 
supplemented  by  various adjustments to government assets and lia- 
bilities. Eisner and Pieper (1984) and Eisner (1986) provide some evi- 
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than are conventional deficits. Boskin (1988) presents evidence that 
the private propensity to consume out of the excess of government 
tangible capital over explicit debt is 0.04, about the same as generally 
found for private wealth. This suggests that public and private saving 
are substitutes in the sense that increased government tangible capital 
increases private  consumption  and  decreases private  saving. These 
studies indicate that the type of data generated in this paper may be 
of  some use in  the studies of  the effect of fiscal policy on short-run 
stabilization and/or long-run growth. 
Having discussed  their usefulness  and limitations,  we turn to the 
numbers. In table 6.17, balance sheets for the federal government for 
1970,1980, and 1985 are provided. As throughout this paper, the figures 
are in 1985 dollars. While real liabilities of the federal government grew 
by  18 percent between 1970 and 1980, the net debt, owing in part to 
rising gold prices, fell by  14 percent. Net worth grew by $692 billion, 
to over $1.0 trillion. While many were bemoaning record deficits, the 
value of  federal assets, especially oil and gas, was growing rapidly. In 
the  1980s, the picture  is very different. Despite  large investment in 
reproducible assets, particularly for the military, the value of federal 
Table 6.17  “Balance Sheet” for Federal Government, Selected Years (billions 
of 1985 dollars) 
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Foreign exchange-special  drawing rights 




























1,661  .O  1,787.7 
941.8  1,064.9 
27.8  29.5 
469.1  443.1 
274.8  376.7 
170.1  215.5 
226.5  231.3 
492.7  491.5 
939.5  1,031.1 
40.8  53.4 
203.2  86.4 
20.3  32.1 
169.2  205.8 
157.2  194.3 
12.0  11.5 
172.4  224.9 
262.6  317.7 
9.3  10.6 
61.7  100.2 
2,600.5  2,818.8 
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Table 6.17  (continued) 
I970  1980  1985 
Liabilities 
Treasury currency and special drawing 
Demand deposits and currency 
Bank reserves and vault cash 










Note: Contingent liabilities:b 
































































Nofe:  N.A.  = not available. 
aIncludes real revaluations as discussed in text. 
bFor  loans and guarantees, see text. Deposit insurance very rough estimates from Boskin, 
Barham, et al. (1987) and sources cited therein. 
‘From  Leonard (1985). 
dFrom Leonard (1987). Estimates are for 1982. 
eFrom Boskin (1987) and sources cited therein. 
assets  increased  by  about  8  percent  (less if  1986  were  considered 
because of falling real oil prices). Meanwhile, federal liabilities reached 
record levels. The result is that net worth dropped by  $727 billion in 
only five years, unraveling the gains made over the 1970s. Most of this 
drop occurred after the end of the recession. 
State and local government net worth, excluding pension obligations, 
also grew substantially during the 1970s, as shown in table 6.18. Tan- 
gible assets increased by about $1.0 trillion, while net debt fell. Net 
worth grew by  more than 80 percent in  real terms. Neither net debt 
nor tangible assets changed much from 1980 to 1985 so that net worth 341  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
Table 6.18  “Balance Sheet” for State and Local Governments, Selected Years 
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aIncludes real revaluations as discussed in text. 
%tate and local mineral rights estimates are calculated only for 1980 and 1985 and because 
of  the data limitations are perhaps less reliable than the other items included. Tangible 
assets and “net worth” for 1970 are understated because of the absence of a mineral 
rights estimate. For a discussion of  contingent liabilities and unfunded pensions, see 
text. 
CFrom  R. Inman (1985). Estimates are for 1980 and include teachers retirement systems 
only; they are therefore a lower bound. 
remained about $2.5 trillion. The net worth of  state and local govern- 
ments is still larger, according to our calculations, than the total finan- 
cial liabilities of the federal government. 
Finally, with the provisos mentioned above, we report estimates from 
other sources of large contingent and potential liabilities. For example, 
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part of  social security is almost $500  billion under the intermediate 
economic and demographic projections; for hospital  insurance, it  is 
over $2 trillion (see Boskin 1987; and Boskin and Puffert 1987). Federal 
civil  service  and  military  retirement  systems  unfunded  liabilities 
amounted to over $1 trillion for 1980. 
6.12  Conclusion 
We  have presented new, updated, and adjusted estimates of various 
components of the government’s contribution-positive  or negative- 
to national wealth and its growth in  the postwar period.  We  have in- 
voked numerous caveats along the way and have attempted to highlight 
what we believe are some important points. We  have not gone as deeply 
into some aspects of these issues as some other previous authors in 
order to go further in other dimensions of  the problem. Our primary 
substantive conclusions are as follows. 
1.  The share of national output devoted to consumption has risen 
substantially, while that devoted to net saving has fallen sharply, in the 
period 1951-85.  The private consumption rate has risen about 6 per- 
centage points, from 63 to 69 percent over this period, while the gov- 
ernment consumption rate has fallen slightly. The national saving rate 
has fallen about 4 percentage points. 
2. The federal government consumption rate has fallen dramatically, 
from  13.7 to 8.7 percent from  1950 to 1985. In the same period, the 
state and local consumption rate has risen from 9.7 to 12.6 percent. 
3. The extension of traditional saving and investment measurement 
to include consumer durables and government tangible investment raises 
the national saving rate substantially, as do our depreciation estimates. 
For example, in  1985, the gross and net saving rates rise from a tra- 
ditionally measured  13.8 and 3.2 percent to 24.5 and 8.8 percent, re- 
spectively, about 1.5 percentage points of the increased net saving rate 
resulting from our lower estimates of depreciation on conventionally 
defined business capital. 
4. The federal government’s assets, tangible and financial, are sub- 
stantial; throughout the 1970s, they grew much more rapidly than the 
national debt. By  1980, we estimate federal tangible assets, in constant 
1985 dollars, at $1.7 trillion and financial assets at $940 billion compared 
to liabilities of  $1.5 trillion. 
5. Since about 1980, the “net worth” news is much worse, as con- 
ventional liabilities have grown much faster than assets, causing about 
a $727 billion decline in federal net worth. 
6.  The state and local government sector also contributes importantly 
to government  and national  wealth.  The state-and-local-sector fixed 343  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
reproducible capital is about twice the federal amount, $1.9 trillion in 
1985 versus $1 .O trillion. The difference between assets and liabilities 
is also greater, as well as more stable, for state and local governments. 
The estimated “net worth” of state and local governments was about 
$2.5 trillion in both  1980 and 1985. 
7. Total government reproducible capital amounts to a sizable frac- 
tion of corresponding private capital. In 1985, the public capital stock 
was 55 percent of the private nonresidential capital stock. 
8. Government net investment has often been sufficient to turn the 
government sector into a net saver despite large budget deficits; that 
is, assets were accruing more rapidly than liabilities. 
9. It is important, if difficult, to go beyond traditional structures and 
equipment investment, and capital stocks. Inventories, mineral rights, 
and land are quantitatively quite important (over $900 billion in  1985 
for the federal government alone) and the most volatile components of 
government saving. Real revaluations of tangible capital, inventories, 
land, and mineral rights are frequently substantial. 
10. Very large contingent and potential liabilities must be considered, 
although we prefer not to add them directly to the more contractual 
obligations. Changes in rules governing social security, for example, 
can produce changes in potential unfunded liabilities almost as large 
as the regular privately held national debt. Some previous attempts to 
incorporate contingent liabilities and unfunded pensions have inappro- 
priately focused on either the maximum risk exposure in the former or 
a closed-group concept of liabilities for the latter. 
In establishing the value of various components and aggregate gov- 
ernment assets, liabilities, and net worth, the covariance of the likely 
revenues or outlays associated with the assets and liabilities with other 
returns and outlays for the government, and, indeed, other components 
of  national income, must be considered. We  have not even begun to 
do so here. Additional considerations concern the government’s power 
to print money and to tax. 
We  hope that this study, by focusing attention on the role of the gov- 
ernment sector in the generation and formation of national wealth, will 
join a growing list of important studies enabling us to improve the sys- 
tem of accounts used in reporting economic activity in the United States 
and in analyzing the performance of the economy. Much research re- 
mains to be done before some of the thorny issues addressed here are 
resolved to the extent that such accounts can stand alongside traditional 
national income accounts on a daily basis,49  but the evidence from this 
and other recent studies suggests that failing to do so may seriously dis- 
tort our notion of the levels and rates of growth of national saving, cap- 
ital formation, and other dimensions of economic performance. 344  M. J. BoskinJM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
Notes 
1. The theory of  local public goods suggests that there may be at least a 
partial market test for site-specific investments. 
2. Various government-sponsored  enterprises that are, at least nominally, 
private also maintain a specific line of credit at the Treasury. Still more subtle 
is the treatment  of mandated private activity.  While the economic “rules of 
the game,”  establishing property rights and the like, are made by the govern- 
ment, governments in advanced economies have increasingly required the pri- 
vate sector to engage in various activities and provide various types of benefits. 
For example, when  pollution-  and safety-control equipment is mandated by 
law for automobiles, regardless of whether the activity mandated passes social 
cost-benefit tests, the expenditures are counted as part of gross private auto 
sales, although they are close substitutes for the government levying a tax and 
paying the automobile companies  to install  them. Various recent proposals 
would require employers to pay for health insurance coverage for all employ- 
ees. Quite aside from the effects this might have on wages and/or employment, 
it would be considered in the data as private compensation of employees, not 
government taxes and spending. 
A related issue is what to do about uncompensated or below-market  com- 
pensation services “purchased”  by the government. For example, a military 
draft presumably enables the government to hire military personnel at below- 
market wage rates (for estimates of these uncompensated services in the twenty- 
five years after World War 11,  see Eisner and Nebhut 1982). This issue is not 
confined to the government  but extends to the private  sector as well.  For 
example,  substantial  uncompensated  volunteer  time is given by millions of 
Americans every year to various charitable causes. This often enables the free- 
or below-market price dispensation of various services, and, hence, the size 
of  this product is underestimated  in the national income accounts. We  do not 
propose  magic answers to these problems; we only raise difficult questions 
and applaud those who have sought to assign plausible orders of magnitude to 
them. 
Another important distinction is between consumption and investment ex- 
penditures.  Again,  accounting rules and various  conventions  in the private 
sector make even the traditional private-sector data somewhat suspect. In the 
booming microelectronics and software industries, much of what an economist 
might think of as investment-a  purchase made to enhance future earnings- 
becomes totally obsolete before the three-year period elapses that distinguishes 
investment from consumption expenditures. 
3. The government spends substantial amounts on education and health- 
as does the private  sector-and  other forms of  spending that may include a 
substantial  human  capital component. How  much  of this  is investment  vs. 
consumption? Various recent studies have attempted to ascertain this human 
capital component for both the private and the government sector (see Kendrick 
1976; and Eisner and Nebhut 1982). Certainly, the expenditures are quite large, 
and, if  all such expenditures are included, gross investment in human capital 
is about as large as gross investment  in tangible capital. But  not all the ex- 
penditures is investment, and, of course, the stock of such capital depreciates 
and obsolesces. 
4. Musgrave (1980, 1986) and Bureau of Economic Analysis (1982). 
5.  For more details on the BEA methodologies,  see Bureau of  Economic 
Analysis (1982) and Musgrave (1980). 345  Government Saving, Capital Formation, and Wealth in the U.S. 
6. A bell-shaped Winfrey S-3 retirement distribution is used to assign service 
lives ranging from 45 to 155 percent of the mean service life for each category. 
7. Hulten  and Wykoff  (1981) state that  “the age-price  profiles estimated 
using the Box-Cox model were very close, on average, to being geometric in 
form”  (p. 93). The eight NIPA asset categories for which depreciation rates 
were calculated directly as averages of rates for the assets they study were 
tractors, construction  machinery, metalworking machinery, general industrial 
equipment, trucks, autos, industrial buildings, and commercial buildings. 
8. For further discussion of the strengths and weakness of the estimates and 
the used-asset-price approach, see Hulten and Wykoff (1981), DeLeeuw (1981), 
Taubman (1981), and Boskin, Robinson, and Roberts (in press). 
9. For additional discussion of the theoretical issues, see Boskin, Robinson, 
and Huber (1987). 
10. For further discussion of this point, see Jorgenson (1986) and Jorgenson 
and Griliches (1972). 
11. For some categories, such as military equipment, there are no private 
analogues and little or no secondary market. Even for government assets com- 
parable to private  categories, depreciation  may  be  systematically  different, 
owing, e.g., to differences in maintenance.  Any adjustments  to depreciation 
rate would be quite arbitrary, however, without more information. 
12. On the basis of studies (e.g., Jack Faucett Associates 1974; and Kendrick 
1976) that estimate or assume a shorter service life than the BEA does, we 
assume a forty-year service life for highways and streets instead of the BEA’s 
sixty-year life. 
13. The BEA’s 1982 dollar estimates were updated by the price indices used 
by  the BEA to derive its current and constant dollar estimates.  These price 
indices are implicit in the BEA current- and constant-cost net capital stock, 
investment, and depreciation data, as found in the 1986 BEA wealth data tape. 
Separate indices are used for each asset type, and values differ slightly for 
stocks (end of year) and flows (yearly average). 
Thus, we converted the constant-cost net capital stock estimates from 1982 
to 1985 dollars for each BEA asset category by multiplying the 1982 dollar net 
capital stock series by the ratio of the 1985 BEA current-cost net capital stock 
to the BEA constant-cost (1982 dollars) net capital stock. Similarly, we mul- 
tiplied the corresponding  investment  and depreciation  flows by  the ratio of 
1985 current-cost  depreciation  to  1985  constant-cost  depreciation  (1982 dol- 
lars). This reflects the BEA’s use of an end-of-the-year price index for stocks 
and a yearly average price index for investment and depreciation flows. 
We  attempted to reproduce the BEA estimates from the gross investment 
and service life data. We exactly succeeded for several categories, but we were 
slightly off on others. We  believe the differences result from our incomplete 
data on BEA adjustments for intersectoral  transfers. To correct for this and 
other possible statistical discrepancies, we subtracted the excess of our straight- 
line estimates over the BEAs  from our estimates. 
14. The different trend is due to the smaller share of equipment in government 
investment in the postwar years. For further discussion and detailed estimates, 
see Boskin, Robinson, and Roberts (in press) and Boskin, Robinson, and Huber 
(1987). 
15. Much of the worry about the infrastructure, however, concerns deferred 
maintenance.  As  Hulten  and  Peterson  (1984) point out, maintenance  is not 
counted  as investment.  If  governments  spend less on maintenance  than the 
private sector does, our depreciation estimates may be too low. Of course, we 
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well  be  deteriorating  in  some areas  while  substantial  investment goes  on 
elsewhere. 
16. We have scaled the GNP  deflator to equal 1  .O at the end of 1985. Eisner’s 
(1980) definition of real net revaluations seems to be identical to  ours. However, 
he deflates slightly differently. We believe our method corresponds more closely 
to the definition. 
17. The data were kindly provided to us by John Musgrave. We  are also 
grateful to Paul Pieper for his assistance. The BEA 1982 constant dollar esti- 
mates of  federal  government military  and  nonmilitary,  and state and local 
government, inventories were each updated to constant 1985 dollars by mul- 
tiplying by the ratio of the 1985 BEA current dollar stock to the 1985 constant 
(1982) dollar stock for each type. Inventory investment was then calculated as 
the change in net stock from the previous year. 
18. This breakdown was provided to us by Paul Pieper on the basis of BEA 
data. 
19. For a review of the literature on valuing the services of  consumer du- 
rables, see Katz (1983). 
20. Hulten and Wykoff applied their rates only through  1974. Recent work 
by  Hulten, Robertson, and Wykoff (1986) suggests that depreciation did not 
shift substantially after the oil shocks. Hulten and Wykoff did not attempt to 
find a depreciation rate for residential capital either. 
21. The BEA methodology is described in Musgrave (1979). Kendrick (1976) 
also used double-declining balance for nonvehicle consumer durables. For a 
discussion of alternative depreciation assumptions for consumer durables, see 
Katz (1983). 
22. Our depreciation estimates for residential and nonresidential structures 
are significantly lower than the BEAs,  while our estimates of the depreciation 
of consumer durables are much higher. 
23. Martin, Landefeld, and Peskin (1982) consider several methods for cal- 
culating the value of services of government capital net of depreciation. The 
current-cost framework values all  vintages of  capital at current prices  and 
interest rates. This method would be appropriate if  we were using a market 
value of government capital as set, e.g.,  in a stock market since the market 
would demand the same rate of return on all capital of similar risk. With our 
cost-base capital estimates, such a measure would overstate fluctuations as 
interest rates change. 
A second method used by Martin, Landefeld, and Peskin is a vintage frame- 
work, under which investment in any year is assumed to meet a cost-benefit 
test with an interest rate appropriate to the year. They use a five-year average 
of  nominal interest rates as their proxy for the discount rate used at the time 
of investment. It seems unlikely, however, that investment decisions vary with 
fluctuations in interest rates, particularly nominal rates. When inflation  rates 
change, using nominal rates means that the real value of services would vary 
for the existing capital. 
We prefer their third method of assuming a constant real rate of return. They 
use a 7 percent real rate, but we believe that that is probably above the rate 
of return actually achieved on government capital. Hence, we use a 3 percent 
real rate. The calculations, particularly of saving rates, are quite insensitive to 
the constant real rate chosen. 
24. While we have alternative estimates based on different combinations of 
deflators of the various components, the estimates reported here for compara- 
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the corresponding period. The corresponding  constant dollar figures are similar 
but  show  a  smaller  rise  in  private  consumption  and  fall  in  government 
consumption. 
25. The methodology is described in an appendix to Eisner (1986). Eisner 
and Pieper build on work by Seater (1981) and Cox and Hirschhorn (1983). 
26. The large interest subsidies received by state and municipal bondholders 
and some borrowers from federal agencies might suggest further refinements 
of these adjustments if one were willing to contemplate sales of portfolios to 
the private sector that continued to carry tax advantages. 
27. We are grateful to Paul Pieper for providing us with 1985 par-to-market 
indices. 
28. While revising and updating the data, we discovered a programming error 
underlying table  I  of Boskin et al. (1985). We correct the series in table 6.12. 
Fortunately, the qualitative conclusions of Boskin et al. (1985) are unaffected 
by the error, but the revised estimates are about one-third lower. 
29. We  shall argue below, however, that severance taxes on the production 
should also be counted as royalties. 
30. For a more complete  description and discussion of the method, see Boskin 
et al. (1985). The following persons provided unpublished data or other assis- 
tance with  this  section:  L. Cordova of  the Minerals  Management Service, 
D. Everitts  and  H. Gonzalez  of  the  California  State  Lands  Commission, 
S. Sharlot of  the Texas General Land Office, B. Van Dyke of  the Alaska Di- 
vision of Oil and Gas, and C. Logsdon of the Alaska Department of Revenue. 
31. Without this assumption, one needs to know the rates of leasing, dis- 
covery, and production of the resources.  For a justification, see Boskin et al. 
(1985). We consider alternative  assumptions, as  did Boskin et al. (1983, below. 
32. Since the government receives royalty revenue only on oil actually pro- 
duced, it seems appropriate for a wealth calculation to use the best estimate of 
oil reserves rather than have reserves fluctuate with changing geologic predic- 
tions. Reserve estimates should change, though, as prices and technology change. 
Given the assumption of rising real prices, however, oil that is not profitable to 
produce at current prices will probably become profitable in the future. Even 
using a reserve estimate made with high real prices-Boskin  et al. (1985) use 
1981 figures-will  probably understate ultimate recovery of oil and gas. 
33. Implicitly, this assumes that oil and gas markets are in equilibrium each 
year. 
34. If prices grow more slowly than the interest rate by 1 or 2 percent, and 
if  we assume that 10  percent of proven reserves are produced and 3 percent 
of undiscovered reserves are proven each year, then the value in 1981 would 
fall to $494 or $383 billion, respectively. 
35. Production figures are from U.S. Department of Energy (1986a). Except 
for Alaska, most oil and gas on state land is underwater. Louisiana is the only 
significant omission. 
36. The figure for Alaska is based on a phone conversation with the state 
Department of Revenue (the figure quoted was 99.75 percent). The California 
and Texas percentages are based on mimeo sheets on “tide and submerged 
lands”  with  the Texas figure  inferred from royalties,  royalty  rates, and an 
assumed price.  No information was available  on other state-owned  land  in 
either state. 
37. Alaska changed from using a formula based on fraction of investment 
and employment in the state to one based on sales when the oil pipeline was 
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38. Actually, the figure is even greater since Alaskan revenue increases more 
than proportionally  with the world oil price and Boskin et al. (1985) assume 
rising oil prices. In part, this is due to the high transportation cost of Alaskan 
oil. The state is currently forecasting revenues of $1.70 per barrel for fiscal 
1987, a drop of 63 percent from the 1985 figure with only a 44 percent drop in 
the world oil price. This makes calculating the value of oil and gas rights over 
time even more difficult. 
39. Without a gas pipeline, the value of Alaska’s gas is problematic. 
40. Royalty rates are based on the average of royalty rates on Relinquishment 
Act lands and State Fee lands weighted by the acreage in each category under 
lease. Severance tax rates were provided  by the U.S.  Advisory Commission 
on Intergovernmental Relations. 
41. Reserve figures are from U.S. Department of Energy (1986b). Production 
on state land is calculated using royalties, royalty rates, and a $26 per barrel 
price for oil and a $2.60 per thousand cubic feet price for gas. 
42. Undiscovered  reserve estimates were taken, as usual, from U.S. Geo- 
logical Survey (1981). Texas  figures  are approximate  since  the regions  the 
Geological Survey used were not contiguous with state boundaries. 
43. For a discussion of previous estimates of government land values and 
another version  of  estimates  for the federal government, see Boskin  et al. 
(1985). The following persons provided  unpublished data or other assistance 
with this section: Z. Addison of the Federal Housing Administration, R. Gary 
of the National  Forest Service, B. Daniels of the General Services Adminis- 
tration, J. Jones of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and W.  Sischel. 
44. Although there is a clear upward trend in urban acreage from 1.4 million 
acres in 1968 to 3.7 million acres in 1985, the observations for three years are 
outliers; i.e., there is a change in the time series of more than 20 percent that 
is  reversed  in  the following  year.  These aberrations are due to temporary 
reclassifications  of  land between  the urban and the rural categories, twice in 
the Department of the Navy and once in the Interior Department. We  have 
replaced the irregular values for the agencies in these instances with the average 
of the previous and following years’ values. 
45. The uncertain  nature of government land value estimates is illustrated 
by using the same price and acreage data in the slightly different formulas used 
by  Milgram (1973). The differences in methodology arise in the treatment of 
land that has been newly acquired or reclassified as urban or rural. Milgram 
uses the change in the GSA acquisition cost series to measure total net land 
acquisitions instead of  relying on the GSA acreage  series and price data. In 
contrast to our procedure, Milgram’s estimate of total federal land value does 
not increase when government  land is reclassified from rural to urban  since 
the original acquisition cost is unchanged. There is an increase in the value of 
urban land that is exactly offset by a decrease in the value of rural land. These 
differences cause Milgram’s method to generate much lower estimates of fed- 
eral land values. The 1985 value for Milgram’s method is $133 billion. We prefer 
our method since reclassification  of land from rural to urban as cities expand 
reflects genuine increases in the value of land. However, the large difference 
in estimates derived from somewhat different methods suggests that further 
research remains a high priority. 
46. The interested reader might consult Hurd and Boskin (1984), Diamond 
and Hausman (1984), Feldstein (1974), Barro (1974), and Boskin, Kotlikoff, et 
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47. However, it will not return to the current ratio as gains in life expectancy 
result in a permanent increase in the aged dependency ratio. 
48. In addition to the social security system’s accrued liabilities, the federal 
government  has substantial  other accrued pension  liabilities as well.  These 
include military, veteran, and civilian retirement  and disability compensation 
plans.  Various studies have been done analogous to those on social security, 
attempting to estimate these liabilities. The pension funds of current military 
employees  and  the civil  service pension  system, while  probably  subject to 
revision in years ahead, represent some substantial degree of contractual ob- 
ligation of the federal government. They amount to well over $1 trillion among 
them.  The unfunded  pension  liabilities of  state and local governments have 
been, at times, substantial. Again,  similar caveats to those mentioned above 
49. Attempts to measure either private or government  saving, investment, 
or consumption and, correspondingly, private and government capital should 
use depreciation  methods consistent in treatment of relative vintages of the 
capital stock, i.e., depreciation methods consistent between formation of the 
capital  stock  series  and  the imputed  rental  flow series. This is not  true of 
the NIPAs’ depreciation  or of the depreciation  methods and estimates used 
in most studies of growth accounting. Two recent, important exceptions are 
Jorgenson,  Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(1983).  While  it  is  not  our  purpose  to evaluate the  importance of  these 
distinctions in growth accounting, some studies (see Jorgenson  1986) suggest 
that these differences can be enormously important in partitioning the sources 
of  growth.  For  our purposes,  it  is  clear that the  depreciation  series, and 
therefore  the  net  investment  and  capital  stock  series, differ  substantially, 
primarily  because of  differences  in  the treatment of  structures, relative  to 
NIPA and the BEA capital stock series. 
apply. 
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Comment  Robert Eisner 
Boskin, Robinson, and Huber are pioneers in what 1  hope is a growing 
band who would enlighten our perceptions of the economy as a whole 
by bringing the government sector into the mainstream of accounting 
for saving, capital formation, and wealth. They here offer a number 
of  significant contributions. Among those striking me as most note- 
worthy are their estimates of the value and fluctuations in the value 
of government-owned natural resources and their improved estimates 
of the value of land. 1  warmly endorse as well their sober and measured 
view of “contingent liabilities” and of the nature of the government’s 
social security obligations. They have also added helpfully to correc- 
tions of naive and simplistic views of the nature of government deficits 
(and surpluses). 
Substantial as are their contributions, it behooves the discussant to 
suggest things that they also should have done but did not do and things 
that they might have done differently. Most conspicuous is the exclu- 
sion of  human  capital.  After  all, a prime  role  of  government is to 
facilitate the development and preservation of human capital. Govern- 
ment  contributes  mightily to investments in  education,  health,  and 
research. The government contribution to capital formation can hardly 
be measured meaningfully when these are excluded. 
A second major exclusion relates to net revaluations or capital gains. 
If full accounting is not made for the revaluation of government assets 
and liabilities, the links between saving and capital formation and be- 
tween income and wealth are lost. As the authors do acknowledge, 
meaningful discussions of government budget deficits and balance sheets 
and their effect on the economy cannot take place without recognition 
of the role of revaluations. They do not, however, endeavor to reconcile 
the flows of  “deficit”  and “saving”  with balance sheet items for net 
debt, net worth, and total capital. 
Some measure of the importance of government contribution to hu- 
man capital formation  may  be found  in  my  estimates (Eisner 1985, 
Robert  Eisner is the  William  R. Kenan  Professor  of Economics  at Northwestern 
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1989) that in 1981 the government product going to capital accumulation 
came to $314.9 billion, of  which only $26.7 billion was in  natural re- 
source accumulation; the rest was in  education and training, health, 
and research and development. This compared to a total of only $344.5 
billion for all business fixed investment (excluding owner-occupied non- 
farm dwellings). Boskin, Robinson, and Huber do well to add net gov- 
ernment  investment  in  tangible  assets  to  the  government  surplus 
(perennially a deficit) to get a better measure of government saving, 
still generally found, at the federal level at least, to be negative. But 
their  measure  is  very  far from  being  a meaningful indicator of  the 
government contribution to national capital formation. Boskin, Rob- 
inson, and Huber are not warranted in labeling the change in govern- 
ment net worth as they measure it, the “legacy in government service 
net  of  tax  to future generations.”  They  are all  the  less justified  in 
referring to their  measure of  gross saving as “government’s contri- 
bution to national wealth.” 
I do have some further problems with the authors’ measure of fixed 
reproducible capital, which stems from their depreciation procedures. 
They take Hulten-Wykoff estimates of declining balance depreciation 
rates as a percentage of straight line for equipment and for structures 
and apply these generally to Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) es- 
timated service lives for the various types of government capital. 
The data used by  Hulten and Wykoff (1981) relate to sale prices of 
used private assets. However ingenious, their approach strikes me as 
suspect. Assets that are sold may be  expected to be  worth  less to 
sellers than comparable assets that they retain. Specificity of purpose 
and function are likely to make them still less valuable to purchasers. 
And the “lemon principle”  is likely to lower further what buyers are 
willing to pay. The fact that  Hulten and Wykoff found a geometric 
decline in sales price by age of asset hardly confirms that a geometric 
decline correctly describes the loss of value of assets in place. 
The argument of Christensen and Jorgenson (1973) and Jorgenson 
and Griliches (1972), resurrected by Boskins, Robinson, and Huber, 
that geometric depreciation is theoretically neater or “consistent”  be- 
cause a geometric decline in efficiency or flow of capital services would 
then (with constant rates of discount) correspond to geometric declines 
in  value, is not  evidence that  depreciation is in  fact geometric. As 
Denison (1972) pointed out, the combination of declines in efficiency, 
obsolescence, and discount rates  may well (and probably  do) make 
straight line a reasonable approximation to economic depreciation (see 
also Eisner 1973). Given straight-line depreciation, it is clearly possible 
to impute service flows as the sum of depreciation and the return on 
capital consistent with the rates of discount implicit in the calculation 
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The effect of Boskin, Robinson, and Huber’s depreciation assump- 
tion is a somewhat faster depreciation and hence lesser capital stock 
in government equipment than estimates such as those of Eisner (1986) 
taken from BEA straight-line-depreciation net stocks but a consider- 
ably slower depreciation and hence much larger estimates of net stocks 
of  structures. Which estimates are most appropriate is still another 
matter because the true lives and rates of obsolescence and decline in 
efficiency remain critical. 
A final caveat relates to Boskin, Robinson, and Huber’s measure of 
government  consumption. They define this as total government ex- 
penditures  for goods and  services minus government investment in 
tangible assets plus the imputed services of government tangible cap- 
ital. They then offer measures of the total of private and “public” 
consumption as indicators of the extent to which we are consuming 
now at the expense of the future. But much of government spending 
relates essentially to intermediate  product or “regrettables”  such as 
defense, police, and transportation, which contribute to final product, 
if  they do, of investment as well as consumption. And Boskin, Rob- 
inson, and Huber’s government “consumption” very considerably in- 
volves services that go to  the production of human and other intangible 
capital that are rather of the nature of investment than consumption. 
In similar  vein,  Boskin, Robinson, and Huber’s definition  of  net 
government  saving  tells  us  little  about  government-let  alone  na- 
tional-capital formation. For government borrowing from the private 
sector may  in fact be used to finance, directly or indirectly, private 
capital  formation.  And  government borrowing  from  abroad cannot 
properly be viewed as a charge against domestic saving without a full 
accounting for capital gains and losses from both exchange rate changes 
and other factors. Huge recent declines in the value of the U.S. dollar, 
for example, generated gains in the dollar value of U.S.  holdings abroad 
that largely counterbalanced our deficits on current account. 
The financial deficit of the government, conventionally viewed as 
public dissaving and still taken by Boskins, Robinson, and Huber as a 
component  of government saving, may actually contribute  to capital for- 
mation, as noted in Eisner (1986). The deficit, particularly when mea- 
sured as the increase in real debt of government, generally stimulates 
more private consumption and investment.  There is in fact “crowding 
in” of investment rather than “crowding out.” And the current account 
deficit and capital account surplus with the rest of the world do not, given 
changes in exchange rates as well as prices, necessarily reflect any de- 
cline in our national net worth. It might be well, therefore, to pay less 
attention to Boskin, Robinson, and Huber’s measure of net government 
saving and more to net government capital formation and, ultimately, to 
net national capital formation, broadly defined. 356  M. J. BoskinlM. S. RobinsonIA. M. Huber 
Note 
1. That proper concerns with regard to government debt must relate largely 
to its effect on private  agents in the economy is a prime reason why  I  am 
skeptical as to the usefulness of Boskin, Robinson, and Huber’s recommen- 
dation, not implemented in their current paper, that the value of state and local 
debt be reduced to reflect its tax-exempt status. The worth of that debt to its 
holders is its market value. Further, as the authors acknowledge, it is not clear 
that state and local governments can and do invest the bulk of the proceeds 
of  their borrowing in assets with a return in excess of their borrowing costs 
or that whatever arbitrage they can engage in is not already reflected in their 
balance sheets. 
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